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Abstract:
This article is part of a symposium on "Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of
States in U.S. Immigration Policy." Although only time will tell, September 11, 2001
promises to be a watershed in the history of the United States. Not long after the tragedy,
supporters and critics alike saw the federal government as "pushing the envelope" in
restricting civil liberties in the name of national security. This article analyzes the nation's
response to the horrific loss of life of September 11 and shows how the centralization of
immigration power in the hands of the federal government, may exacerbate the civil
rights impacts of the enforcement of the immigration laws. The federal government has
acted more swiftly and uniformly than the states ever could, with severe consequences for
the Arab and Muslim community in the United States. That the reaction was federal in
nature - and thus national in scope as well as uniform in design and impact, and with
precious few legal constraints - worsened the civil rights impacts.
The civil rights deprivations resulting from federal action reveals that national regulation
of immigration is a double-edged sword. Although federal law pre-empts state laws
designed to regulate immigration or discriminate against aliens, it can also, with few legal
constraints, strike out at immigrants across the nation if it sees fit. That in turn suggests
that the role of states, as well as the federal government, in the regulation of immigration
and immigrants, especially in times of national crisis, deserves most serious attention.
The federal government's response to September 11 also demonstrates the close
relationship between immigration law and civil rights in the United States. Noncitizens
historically have been the most vulnerable to civil rights deprivations, in large part
because the law permits, perhaps even encourages, extreme governmental conduct with
minimal protections for the rights of noncitizens. Unfortunately, the current backlash
against Arabs and Muslims in the United States fits comfortably into a long nativist
history.
In sum, a complex matrix of "otherness" based on race, national origin, religion, and
political ideology contributes to the current attacks on the civil rights of Arabs and
Muslims in the United States. As has occurred in the past, the ripple effects of national
security measures in the end may adversely affect the legal rights of all noncitizens, not
just Arabs and Muslims. Indeed, as we contend in this article, the civil rights deprivations
resulting from the war on terrorism may have long term adverse impacts on the civil
rights of citizens as well as noncitizens in the United States.
To help us better understand the latest "war on terrorism," Part I of the Article analyzes
the general demonization of Arabs and Muslims generally in the United States and how
the law has been influenced by, and reinforced, the negative stereotypes. This section
reviews the federal government's actions directed at Arabs and Muslims in the name of
combating terrorism well before September 11. As Professor Edward Said has observed,
terrorism in these times "has displaced Communism as public enemy number one." That
has translated into a near exclusive focus on "foreign terrorists," particularly Arabs and
Muslims. Part II studies the federal government's zealous investigatory methods after

September 11 directed at Muslim and Arab noncitizens, with disregard for their civil
rights, and the possible long term impacts of that response.
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1

Although only time will tell, September 11, 2001 promises to
be a watershed in the history of the United States. After the
tragic events of that morning, including the hijacking of three
commercial airliners subsequently used as weapons of mass
destruction,1 America went to war on many fronts, including but
not limited to military action in Afghanistan.2 As needed and
expected, heightened security and an intense criminal
investigation followed. Moreover, almost immediately after the
tragedy, Arabs and Muslims, as well as those appearing to be
Arab or Muslim, were subject to crude forms of racial profiling.3
Airlines removed Arab and Muslim passengers, including a Secret
Service agent assigned to protect President Bush, from an
airplane for making the flight crew uncomfortable. 4 Hate
crimes against Arabs, Muslims, and others rose precipitously.5
1

See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows to
Exact Punishment for `Evil , N.Y. TIMES, Sept 12, 2001, at A1.
2

Congress, however, did not formally declare war, which
allows the President expansive powers over alien enemies under
the Alien Enemy Act of 1798. See J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty,
and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402 (1992). Thus, many of
the security measures adopted by the federal government, see
infra text accompanying notes __, cannot be said to have been
authorized by Congress.
3

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

4

See Guard for Bush Isn t Allowed Aboard Flight, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at B5; Ken Ellingwood & Nicholas Riccardi,
Arab Americans Enduring Hard Stares of Other Fliers, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2001, at A1; Phillip Morris, Racial Profiling Has a New
Target, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 25, 2001, at B9. In response to early
reports of discrimination against Arab and Muslim appearing
people, the Department of Transportation issued a Policy
Statement emphasizing that a person cannot be disparately treated
solely based on national origin or religion. See U.S. Dep t of
Transportation, Carrying out Transportation Inspection and Safety
Responsibilities in a Nondiscriminatory Manner, Oct. 17, 2001
(www.dot.gov/airconsumer/OGCreminder1./htm).
5

See Laurie Goodstein & Tamar Lewin, Victims of Mistaken
Identity, Sikhs Pay a Price for Turbans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2001, at A1; Tamar Lewin & Gustav Niebuhr, Attacks and Harassment
on Middle Eastern People and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001,
at B5; see also Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The DeAmericanization and Subordination of Immigrant America,
unpublished manuscript on file with authors (documenting hate
2

In Arizona, a U.S. citizen claiming vengeance for his country
killed a Sikh immigrant from India based on the mistaken belief
that this turban-wearing, bearded man was Arab. 6

crimes against Muslims after September 11 and tying this period
into historical antecedents); 147 CONG. REC. E2150 (Nov. 28, 2001)
(Rep. Conyers) (stating that, from September 11 to November 28,
2001 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee had investigated
over 450 hate crimes); 147 CONG. REC. H8174, 8174-75 (Nov. 14,
2001) (Rep. Woolsey) (recounting statistical data showing
precipitous rise in hate crimes against Muslims and Arabs after
September 11). The Council on American-Islamic Relations
reported nearly one thousand anti-Arab, Muslim incidents around
the country between September 11 and October 22, 2001. See
http://www.cair-net.org. By the end of October, 2001, the
Department of Justice was investigating over 250 hate crimes
against Arabs and Muslims nationwide. See
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.ht (Jan. 21,
2002); Author Conversations in Oct. 2001 with Casey Stavropoulos
and Dan Nelson, U.S. Dep t of Justice, Civil Rights Section,
Public Information Div.
6

See Goldstein & Lewin, supra note _; Richard Serrano,
Assaulting Against Muslims, Arabs Escalating, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2001, at A1.

3

Not long after the tragedy, supporters and critics alike saw
the federal government as pushing the envelope in restricting
civil liberties in the name of national security.6 Other
contributions to this symposium analyze the devolution of
immigration regulation from the federal government to the
states.7 This article analyzes the nation s response to the
horrific loss of life of September 11 and shows how the
centralization of immigration power in the hands of the federal
government, may exacerbate the civil rights impacts of the
6

See Christian Berg, Thornburgh: Bush Doing Just Fine,
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pennsylvania), Nov. 16, 2001, at A4
(quoting former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh); J.M.
Lawrence, Civil Rights Advocates Wary About the Future, BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 28, 2001, at 34 (reporting concerns of civil rights
advocates that federal government might have popular support to
push the envelope on infringing on civil liberties).
7

See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Devolution and
Discrimination, 58 ANN. SURVEY AM. LAW (forthcoming 2002); CITE TO
OTHER SYMPOSIUM PAPERS ON THIS TOPIC. The proper role, if any,
for the states in immigration enforcement has emerged as an issue
of academic commentary. Compare Peter J. Spiro, The States and
Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT L L.
131 (1994) [hereinafter Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties] (contending
that states should have increased role in immigration matters);
Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live With Immigration Federalism, 29
CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997) (analyzing states new power over
defining benefit eligibility for aliens in 1996 welfare reform
law), with Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign
Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J.
INT L L. 217 (1994) (challenging Spiro s argument and defending
federal pre-emption of state efforts to regulate immigration);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and
Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT L L. 201 (1994) (questioning
Spiro s thesis on grounds that the federal government should play
central role in formation of immigrants national identity);
Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The
Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 367
(1999) (analyzing difficulties of federal government working with
state and local agencies in the deportation of criminal aliens
and analyzing potential for creation of better working
relationship); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection and
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (criticizing devolution
of authority to states to discriminate against aliens in welfare
reform laws).
4

enforcement of the immigration laws. The federal government has
acted more swiftly and uniformly than the states ever could, with
severe consequences for the Arab and Muslim community in the
United States. That the reaction was federal in nature
and
thus national in scope as well as uniform in design and impact,
and with precious few legal constraints8 -- worsened the civil
rights impacts.
The civil rights deprivations resulting from federal action
reveals that national regulation of immigration is a double-edged
sword. Although federal law pre-empts state laws designed to
regulate immigration or discriminate against aliens,9 it can
also, with few legal constraints, strike out at immigrants across
the nation if it sees fit. That in turn suggests that the role
of states, as well as the federal government, in the regulation
of immigration and immigrants, especially in times of national
crisis, deserves most serious attention.

8

See infra text accompanying notes __.

9

See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941);
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp.
755 (1995). In 1996 reforms to the immigration laws, see infra
text accompanying notes __, Congress afforded state and local
governments greater powers to assist the federal government in
the enforcement of the immigration laws, which has raised civil
rights concerns. See Jay T. Jorgensen, The Practical Power of
State and Local Governments to Enforce Federal Immigration Laws,
1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899.

5

The federal government s response to September 11 also
demonstrates the close relationship between immigration law and
civil rights in the United States. Noncitizens historically have
been the most vulnerable to civil rights deprivations, in no
small part because the law permits, and perhaps even encourages,
extreme governmental conduct with minimal protections for the
rights of noncitizens.10 Unfortunately, the current backlash
against Arabs and Muslims in the United States fits comfortably
into a long nativist history, including the Alien and Sedition
Act of the 1790s, the Palmer Raids and the Red Scare that
followed World War I, and other concerted efforts by the U.S.
government to stifle political dissent.11 This historical moment
is especially troubling because, reminiscent of the Japanese
internment during World War II,12 perceived racial, coupled with
religious and other, difference amplifies the animosity toward
10

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

11

See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The
Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the
Immigration Laws: Important Lessons For Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 841-69 (1997) [hereinafter
Johnson, Antiterrorism]; see also Victor C. Romero, On Elian and
Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL Y 343, 359-62 (2000/01) (contending that
Supreme Court s deference to Congress and Executive Branch in
combating terrorism is reminiscent of anti-Chinese and anticommunist sentiment of previous eras). The Alien and Sedition
Acts were designed to eliminate political subversives from the
United States, and can be viewed as a Federalist effort to reduce
immigrant support for the Republican Party. See generally JAMES
MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956). The Palmer Raids were raids, following a
series of bombings, conducted under the direction of U.S.
Attorney General Mitchell Palmer resulting in the deportation of
alleged subversives. See Johnson, Antiterrorism, supra, at 84650.
12

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during
World War II); see also A.G. Block, History for Our Times: Pearl
Harbor and the Birth of Modern California, CAL. J., Nov. 2001, at
8 (analyzing similarities between the government s response to
the attack on Pearl Harbor and violence of September 11, 2001).
See generally Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 1, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1998) (analyzing implications
of Korematsu decision).
6

Arabs and Muslims.13
In sum, a complex matrix of otherness based on race,
national origin, religion, and political ideology contributes to
the current attacks on the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims in
the United States.14 As has occurred in the past, the ripple
effects of national security measures in the end may adversely
affect the legal rights of all noncitizens, not just Arabs and
Muslims.15 Indeed, as we contend in this article, the civil
rights deprivations resulting from the war on terrorism may have
13

See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese
American Redress and the Racing of Arab Americans as
Terrorists, 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 11-26 (2001). See generally MICHAEL
OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994)
(analyzing construction of races in modern United States).
14

See Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee: A Critical Race Critique, 21 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 561, 571-94 (2000) (analyzing multiple dimensions of
identity of Arabs that U.S. government allegedly sought to deport
because of their political activities); see also Susan M. Akram,
Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological
Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999) (reviewing evidence of
discriminatory targeting of Arabs and Muslims by the U.S.
government for detention, removal, and secret evidence
proceedings, in immigration enforcement).
15

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

7

long term adverse impacts on the civil rights of citizens as well
as noncitizens in the United States.
To help us better understand the latest war on terrorism,
Part I of this Article analyzes the general demonization of Arabs
and Muslims generally in the United States and how the law has
been influenced by, and reinforced, the negative stereotypes.
This section reviews the federal government s actions directed at
Arabs and Muslims in the name of combating terrorism well before
September 11.16 As Professor Edward Said has observed, terrorism
in these times has displaced Communism as public enemy number
one. 17 That has translated into a near exclusive focus on
foreign terrorists, particularly Arabs and Muslims. Part II
studies the federal government s zealous investigatory methods
after September 11 directed at Muslim and Arab noncitizens, with
disregard for their civil rights, and the possible long term
impacts of that response.
1.

The Demonization of Persons of Arab and Muslim Ancestry

Commentators long have observed how popular perceptions of
racial and other minorities influence their treatment under the
law.18 This proves to be true with respect to Arabs and Muslims.
16

For a summary of the adverse impacts of 1996 antiterrorism legislation on Arabs and Muslims, see Akram, supra note
__; Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America
and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2825 (2001); infra text accompanying notes ____.
17

Edward Said, The Essential Terrorist, in BLAMING THE
VICTIMS: SPURIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION 149 (Edward Said
& Christopher Hitchens ed., 1988); see LAWRENCE HOWARD, TERRORISM:
ROOTS, IMPACT, RESPONSE 1 (Lawrence Howard ed., 1992) ( The
phenomenon of terrorism has become a major concern of the
American public. The Reagan administration elevated it to the
foremost foreign policy problem of the nation. ).
18

See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of
the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression
Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992);
Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of
Law and Inequality in Popular Film, 15 LEG. STUDS. FORUM 243
(1991); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367
(1996); see also Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping
Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV.
733 (1995) (articulating need to recognize impacts of negative
8

In sum,

stereotypes and prejudice on legal decisionmaking). See
generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317 (1987) (articulating theory of unconscious racism and its
impact on discrimination in modern United States).

9

Arab Americans and Muslims have been raced as
terrorists : foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening.
Although Arabs trace their roots to the Middle East and
claim many different religious backgrounds, and Muslims come
from all over the world and adhere to Islam, these
distinctions are blurred and negative images about Arabs or
Muslims are often attributed to both. As Ibrahim Hooper of
the Council on American-Islamic Relations notes, The common
stereotypes are that we re all Arabs, we re all violent and
we re all conducting a holy war. 19
The demonizing of Arabs and Muslims in the United States,
accompanied by harsh legal measures directed at them, began well
before the tragedy of September 11, 2001.20 It can be traced to
years of mythmaking by film and media,21 popular stereotypes,22
and a campaign to build political support for U.S. foreign policy
in the Middle East.23 Since at least the 1970s, U.S. laws and
19

Saito, supra note __, at 12 (footnote omitted).

20

See Akram, supra note __ (tracing targeting of Arabs
and Muslims in immigration enforcement).
21

See infra text accompanying notes ____.

22

See Edward Said, A Devil Theory of Islam, THE NATION,
Aug. 12, 1996; see also AHMED YOUSEF & CAROLINE KEEBLE, THE AGENT: THE
TRUTH BEHIND THE ANTI-MUSLIM CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA (1999) (tracing impact
of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim campaign in United States).
23

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

10

policies have been founded on the assumption that Arab and Muslim
noncitizens have terrorist links and targeted them for special
treatment under the law.24 The post-September 11 targeting of
Muslims and Arabs is simply the latest chapter in this history.25
2.

The Stereotype of Arabs as Terrorists and Religious
Fanatics

24

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

25

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

11

Similar to the animus toward other racial minorities, antiArab, anti-Muslim animus can be viewed as part of a dynamic
process of racialization. 26 Arabs and Muslims have been
racialized by mainstream U.S. society in different ways from
other minority groups:27
26

Omi and Winant describe race as an unstable and decentered complex of social meanings constantly being transformed
by political struggle.
OMI & WINANT, supra note ___, at 68; see
Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
27

As a historical matter, different racial groups have
been racialized in different ways. See generally JUAN F. PEREA ET
AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2000)
(collecting cases and historical literature on racialization of
African Americans, Asian Americans, Latina/os, and Native
Americans); TIMOTHY DAVIS ET AL., A READER ON RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE

12

The first, and most obvious, is the political violence of
Jewish extremist groups, which is correctly viewed as
emanating from the Arab-Israeli conflict.... The second is a
more nativistic violence which is xenophobic and local in
nature.... The third is a form of jingoist hostility and
violence usually associated with international crises
involving U.S. citizens....28
The law and its enforcement of the law also has contributed to
hostility toward Arabs and Muslims in the United States.29
1.

Politically-Motivated Violence and Intimidation

LAW: A MULTIRACIAL APPROACH (2001) (collecting legal scholarship
analyzing different civil rights issues facing various minority
communities).
28

Nabeel Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the
United States, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB-AMERICAN IDENTITY 180 (Ernest
McCarus ed., 1994) [hereinafter Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism] ; see
also Nabeel Abraham, The Real Target of the Airport Atrocities,
MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 24, 1986, at 14-16; Nabeel Abraham,
Arab-American Marginality: Mythos and Praxis, in ARAB-AMERICANS:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE __ (Baha Abu-Laban & Michael Suleiman eds.,
1989); Nabeel Abraham, The Gulf Crisis and Anti-Arab Racism in
America, in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE NEW WORLD ORDER AT HOME AND ABROAD __
(Cynthia Peters ed., 1991).
29

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

13

The Arab-Israeli conflict contributes to the modern
stereotype of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists.
Jewish
extremist groups constitute an undeniable source of anti-Arab
hate violence not discussed in conventional accounts of racist
violence in the United States. 30 According to the Rand
Corporation, the Jewish Defense League (JDL), was one of the
most active terrorist groups in the United States
in the
31
1980s.
Jewish extremist organizations committed approximately
20 terrorist incidents and numerous other acts of violence,
including extortion or threats, about one-fourth of the total
terrorist acts in the United States in the 1980s.32
Hate crime studies, however, generally fail to separately
identify Arab ethnic origin in their victim classifications.33
30

Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 157

31

BRUCE HOFFMAN, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
POTENTIAL THREAT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES 11, 15 (Rand Corp, 1986).
32

John Harris, Domestic Terrorism in the 1980's, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 1987, at 6; see also Whidden, supra note __
(reviewing data before September 11, 2001, showing that most
recent terrorist acts in the United States were not committed by
Muslim or Arab groups).
33

See, e.g., FBI, Terrorism in the United States, yearly
reports, at http://www.fbi.gov/publications.

14

Others omit Jewish extremist groups from the categories of hate
crime perpetrators.34

34

See, e.g., CHRIS LUTZ, THEY DON T ALL WEAR SHEETS: A
CHRONOLOGY OF RACIST AND FAR RIGHT VIOLENCE 1980-1986 (Center for
Democratic Renewal/National Council of Churches, 1987); ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE GROUPS IN AMERICA (1988); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
EXTREMISM ON THE RIGHT: A HANDBOOK (1988).

15

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of B nai B rith engages in
efforts to intimidate Arabs, Muslims, and others with similar
views on the Middle East conflict, from engaging in political
debate. The ADL aggressively seeks to discredit or silence
critics of Israel or defenders of Palestinian human rights.35 In
1983, for example, the ADL released a handbook entitled Pro-Arab
Propaganda in America: Vehicles and Voices,36 which characterizes
groups or individuals who criticize Israel or Zionism as
extremists intent on eradicating Israel or inciting antiSemitism in America.37 Besides listing of the most prominent
scholars on Middle East issues, from Columbia s Edward Said to
Harvard s Walid Khalidi, the handbook labeled every humanitarian
organization dealing with the Middle East or Palestine as
extremist.
The ADL also has sought to silence pro-Muslim and pro-Arab
messages. For example, most recently, the Florida ADL
unsuccessfully lobbied the Florida Commission on Human Relations
to exclude a Muslim representative from a panel at a civil rights
conference.38 The American Jewish Committee also sought to
35

See Alfred Lilienthal, The Changing Role of B nai
B rith s Anti-Defamation League, WASH. REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS,
June 1993, 18.
36

See Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles and
Voices, A Handbook (Anti-Defamation League of B nai B rith, 1983
ed.), copy on file with the author.
37

See Lilienthal, supra note __, at 18.

38

See ADL and AJC Demand Muslim Panelists Be Excluded,

16

exclude Ghazi Khankan, executive director of the New York chapter
of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), from
participating in a public forum on multicultural understanding
because he was anti-Israel. 39 Along similar lines, the ADL
demanded that CAIR s Northern California director be prevented
from testifying about hate crimes before the California Select
Committee on Hate Crimes.40

WASH. REPORT

ON

MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 83.

39

See id. at 83.

40

See id.

17

Nor have the efforts at silencing opposing political views
stopped at these measures. In January 1993, the results of a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation against
veteran San Francisco Police Department officer Tom Gerard and an
ADL-paid undercover agent Roy Bullock, came to light. Law
enforcement authorities uncovered computerized files on thousands
of Arab Americans and Arab organizations, as well as many other
organizations.41 The ADL s offices contained identical files,
which reflected surveillance of the United Auto Workers, NAACP,
Greenpeace, ACLU, Asian Law Caucus, National Lawyers Guild,
Rainbow Coalition, Jews for Jesus, and three current or past
members of the U.S. Congress (Nancy Pelosi, Ron Dellums, and Pete
McCloskey).42 The information included confidential files from
the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency. The ADL, Gerard,
and Bullock passed the surveillance information on to Israeli and
South African intelligence agencies.43 As part of the settlement
of lawsuits resulting from the investigation, the ADL has been
permanently enjoined from engaging in any further illegal spying
against Arab American and other civil rights groups.44
The overall effect of the ADL s practices is to reinforce
the image of Arabs as terrorists and security threats, thereby
creating a climate of fear, suspicion, and hostility towards
Arab-Americans and others who espouse critical views of Israel,
possibly leading to death threats and bodily harm. 45
41

See Dennis Opatray & Scott Winokur, S.F. Spying Case
Details Laid Bare, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 11, 1993, at __.
42

See Abdeen Jabara, The Anti-Defamation League: Civil
Rights and Wrongs, 45 COVERTACTION, Summer 1993, at 28-29.
43

See Dennis Opatray & Scott Winokur, Israeli Detainee
Linked to S.F. Police Spy Case, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 1993, at
__; Jim McGee, Jewish Group s Tactics Investigated, WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 19, 1993, at __.
44

See Final Settlement, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm v. Anti-Defamation League, Civ. Action No. 93-6358 RAP (Shx)
(C.D. Cal.). The class action was brought by the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, numerous civil rights
organizations, and several individuals. See Michael Gillespie,
Los Angeles Court Hands Down Final Judgment in Anti-Defamation
League Illegal Surveillance Case, WASH. REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS,
Dec. 1999, www.washington-report.org; Martin Berg, ADL Agrees to
Stop Spying on Civil Rights Groups, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 28, 1999.
45

Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 187.
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2.

The Impact of Anti-Arab Images in Popular Culture

Building on existing stereotypes in U.S. society about Arabs
and Muslims, media and film have found a ready audience for
dangerous and one-dimensional images. Such depictions contribute
to the racialization of Arabs and Muslims and promotes and
reinforces unconscious racism toward them.46
Jack Shaheen s review of Hollywood films offers convincing
evidence of the vilification of Arabs and Muslims by the movie
industry.47 Hollywood has made hundreds of movies in which Arabs
or Muslims are portrayed as terrorists or otherwise placed in a
negative, often non-human, light. These movies show Westerners
hurling such epithets at Arabs as assholes , bastards , cameldicks , pigs , devil-worshipers , jackals , rats , ragheads , towel-heads , scum-buckets , sons-of-dogs , buzzards
of the jungle , sons-of-whores , sons-of-unnamed goats , and
sons-of-she-camels. 48 Arab women are portrayed primarily as
weak and mute, covered in black, or as scantily clad belly
dancers.49
The U.S. Department of Defense has cooperated with Hollywood
in making more than a dozen films showing U.S. soldiers killing
46

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

47

See JACK G. SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES
A PEOPLE (2001); see also Saito, supra note __, at 12-14
(summarizing how racial stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims in film
and popular culture affect law enforcement and private conduct).
48

SHAHEEN, supra note __, at 11.

49

See id. at __.
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Arabs or Muslims.50
these movies:

50

Audiences fully embrace the demonization in

See id. at 15.
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To my knowledge, no Hollywood WWI, WWII, or Korean War
movie has ever shown America s fighting forces
slaughtering children. Yet, near the conclusion of
[the movie] Rules of Engagement, U.S. marines open fire
on the Yemenis, shooting 83 men, women, and children.
During the scene, viewers rose to their feet, clapped
and cheered. Boasts director Friedkin, I ve seen
audiences stand up and applaud the film throughout the
United States. 51
Nor has Islam, which is inextricably linked with holy war,
male patriarchy, and terrorism, fared any better on the silver
screen.52 Muslims are shown as hostile invaders, or lecherous
oil sheikhs intent on using nuclear weapons. 53 A far-too-common
scene shows a mosque with Arabs at prayer, cutting away to
showing civilians being gunned down.54
51

Id.

52

See Leti Volpp, Gazing Back, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN S L.J. 149
(1999) (book review) (examining interaction of race, gender, and
culture in stereotypes about Muslim and other noncitizens and
impact on the law).
53

See SHAHEEN, supra note __, at 9.

54

See id.

21

Film portrayals omit Arabs and Muslims as ordinary people,
families with social interactions, or outstanding members of
communities, including scholars, writers, or scientists.55 In
modern U.S. film history, few movies have shown Arabs in a
favorable light, and only a handful in which Arabs and Muslims
had leading roles as protagonists.56 Few commentators have
criticized the one-sided depiction of Arabs and Muslims.57

55

Such stereotypical depictions have been a problem for
other minority groups as well. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra
note __; see also Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of
Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 970-72 (1995) (noting
invisibility of Latina/os in literature and other prominent
places in U.S. culture).
56

See SHAHEEN, supra note __, at 34-35.

57

See id. at 31-33.
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Stereotypes seen in film affect the conduct of public
officials and private citizens. Private citizens and public
officials long have directed hate messages and violence, and
discriminated against, Arabs and Muslims.58 For example, mayoral
candidate Michael Guido distributed a campaign brochure in
Dearborn, a Detroit suburb, in which he claimed the city s Arab
Americans threaten our neighborhoods, the value of our property
and a darned good way of life. 59 In 1981, Michigan governor
William Milliken, said in a newspaper interview that Michigan s
economic woes were due to the `damn Arabs. 60 Such statements
by public officials fuel the perception that attacks on this
58

See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __ at 188-92.
For detailed reports, see AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM.,
1991 REPORT ON ANTI-ARAB HATE CRIMES: POLITICAL AND HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST
ARAB-AMERICANS; AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1995 REPORT ON
ANTI-ARAB RACISM: HATE CRIMES, DISCRIMINATION AND DEFAMATION OF ARABAMERICANS; AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1996-97 REPORT ON HATE
CRIMES & DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS; AMERICAN-ARAB ANTIDISCRIMINATION COMM., 1998-2000 REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS (reports archived at http:///www.adc.org).
59

Let s Talk About City Parks and the Arab Problem,
brochure of the Guido Mayoral campaign (cited in Abraham, AntiArab Racism, supra note __, at 191).
60

Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 196
(quoting Milliken).
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community are acceptable.61

61

See id. at 195; see also supra note __ (citing reports
connecting official policies with anti-Arab violence).
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Because popular perceptions about Arabs and Muslims make
acceptance of their campaign contributions politically risky,
politicians have felt compelled to return financial contributions
from Arab Americans. In the 1984 presidential campaign, Walter
Mondale returned $5,000 in contributions made by U.S. citizens of
Arab ancestry.62 Philadelphia mayoral candidate Wilson Goode
returned over $2,000 in campaign contributions from Arab
Americans.63 In his first congressional race, Joe Kennedy
returned $100 to James Abourezk, a former Democratic senator from
North Dakota who is Arab American.64 Current New York Senator
Hillary Clinton returned $50,000 to Muslim organizations.65
Indeed, New York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani returned ten million
dollars given by a Saudi Arabian for the victims of the World
Trade Center.66
3.

Racism in Times of National Crises

Times of crisis often are accompanied by hostility toward
minorities in the United States. Perpetrators of hate crimes may
not accurately differentiate among victims based on religion or
ethnic origin, from Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians, and Japanese
to Muslims, Sikhs and Christian Arabs.67
62

See Mondale Camp Returns Funds to U.S. Arabs, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1984, at sec. 1, p. 28.
63

See Stephen Franklin, Arab-Americans Fall Victim to
Mid-East Kuwaiti Ship Flagging Sparks Fears, CHI. TRIB., July 12,
1987, at 19.
64

See The Untouchables; Immigration Service Arrests
Palestinians, THE NATION, Mar. 21, 1987.
65

See Dean E. Murphy, Mrs. Clinton Says She Will Return
Money Raised by a Muslim Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, at A1.
This phenomenon resembles the controversy during the Clinton
administration about receipt of campaign contributions from
foreign sources, which resulted in the investigation of many
Asian American contributors. See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN
AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 104-16 (2001).
66

See Neil MacFarquhar, Saudi Sheik Regrets Giuliani
Turning Down His Donation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at B4.
67

See supra text accompanying note __ (discussing murder
of Sikh as act of vengeance against Arabs and Muslims for
September 11 terrorism).
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[W]hile they are closely associated with Islam, only twelve
percent of the United States four to five million Muslims
are Arab and those Arab Muslims comprise a minority of the
Arab American community. American society, however,
identifies Arabs and Islam as one and the same. Coupled
with this presumption is the prevailing misrepresentation of
Islam as bent on a holy war against the United States.
While extremists may invoke the Koran to justify terrorism,
the vast majority of Islamic worshipers are decent, lawabiding, productive citizens. 68

68

Whidden, supra note __, at 2850 (footnotes omitted).
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Terrorist acts by small groups of Arabs and Muslims
frequently are followed by generalized hostility toward Arab and
Muslim communities. In 1985, Lebanese Shi a gunmen highjacked a
TWA Flight 847 to Beirut, horribly beat to death a young American
on the plane, and held the remaining passengers for over two
weeks.69 Violent attacks against persons of Arab and Muslim
origin around the United States followed.70 Islamic centers and
Arab American organizations were vandalized and threatened. A
Houston mosque was firebombed. A bomb placed in the AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee office in Boston exploded,
severely injuring two policemen.71 Later, after terrorists
69

See Stalemate Continues; Hijackers Let Television
Reporters Interview Jet Pilot, THE RECORD, June 19, 1985, at 1.
70

See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 16162; see also Bob Baker, Anti-Arab Violence Represents 17% of
Racial, Religious Attacks in 1985, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1986, at
part 1, p. 29 (discussing hate crime reports).
71

See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note ___, at 162.
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hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise liner and murdered Leon
Klinghoffer, a wave of generalized anti-Arab violence in the
United States ensued, including a bombing of the Los Angeles
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office that killed
its director.72

72

The day before his murder, the director, Alex Odeh, had
appeared on a television interview in which he condemned
terrorist acts, but said he believed Yasser Arafat was not behind
the event. At the time of Odeh s murder, Jewish Defense League
head Irv Rubin stated to reporters:
No Jew or American should
shed one tear for the destruction of a P.L.O. front in Santa Ana
or anywhere else in the world.
Bomb Kills Leader of U.S. Arab
Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1985, at sec. 1, p.5. Rubin later was
indicted for conspiring to bomb a Los Angeles mosque and the
office of California Congressman Darrell Issa, a person of
Lebanese ancestry. See David Rosenzweig, 2 JDL Leaders Are
Indicted by U.S. Grand Jury, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at part 2,
p. 3; see also Delinda C. Hanley, Freeze on Jewish Defense League
Assets Called for After JDL Bomb Plot Foiled, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE
EAST AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 16 (discussing Jewish Defense
League violence against Arabs and Muslims).
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In 1986, in apparent response to the Reagan Administration s
war on terrorism directed at Libya,73 another episode of antiArab hysteria broke out. The same night of the United States
raid on Libya, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
national office in Washington received threats. In addition, the
Detroit American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office, the
Dearborn Arab community center, and the Dearborn Arab-American
newspaper all received bomb threats.74 Beatings and other
violent attacks on Arabs were reported across the United
States.75 The home of a Palestinian immigrant family was broken
into, a smoke bomb thrown inside, and the words Go Back to
Libya scrawled on the walls.76
The Gulf War intensified anti-Arab hostility in the United
States. Before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee had reported five anti-Arab hate
crimes that year. Immediately after the invasion, from August 2,
1990 until February 2, 1991, it reported 86 incidents.77 When
U.S. intervention commenced in January 1991, Arab and Muslim
community organizations were bombed, vandalized, and subject to
harassment, while Arab-owned businesses were vandalized or

73

See infra text accompanying notes __.

74

Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 171, and
sources cited.
75

See supra note __ (citing reports).

76

See Steve Lerner, Terror Against Arabs in America, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 28, 1986, at 24.
77

See supra note __ (citing reports).
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destroyed.78
4.

The U.S. Government and the Role of Law

78

See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, at 204.
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Institutional racism also has resulted in the targeting of
Arabs and Muslims.79 The Nixon Administration s Operation
Boulder was the first concerted U.S. government effort to target
Arabs in the United States for special investigation and
discourage their political activism on Middle Eastern issues.80
Ostensibly designed to confront the threat posed by terrorists
who took hostages and murdered athletes at the 1972 Munich
Olympics, the President s directives authorized the FBI to
investigate people of Arabic-speaking origin to determine their
79

See generally Ian F. Haney-Lopez, Institutional Racism:
Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109
YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (articulating theory of institutional
racism). Law and its enforcement also contributes to the
racialization of Arabs and Muslims. See supra text accompanying
notes __ (discussing racialization process).
80

See PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT __ (1974). For discussion
of the impacts of Operation Boulder on Arab Americans, see The
Civil Rights of Arab-Americans, Information Paper No. 10,
Association of Arab-American University Graduates (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., Jan., 1974).
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potential relationship with terrorist activities related to the
Arab-Israeli conflict.81 The FBI investigated and interrogated
noncitizens and citizens of Arab origin,82 and the FBI and
Justice Department admittedly wiretapped prominent Detroit lawyer
Abdeen Jabara, then-President of the Association of Arab-American
University Graduates.83

81

See N.Y TIMES, Oct. 5, 1972; Israel Fighting Terror with
Terror, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1972; Lawrence Mosher, Arabs Taste
U.S. Terror, NAT. OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 1972; CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 9,
1973; NEWSWEEK, June 18, 1973, at 32. At that time, the only
terrorist acts in the U.S. related to the Arab-Israeli conflict
were committed by the JDL. See Hagopian, Minority Rights in a
Nation-State: The Nixon Administration s Campaign Against ArabAmericans, J. PALESTINE STUDS., Autumn-Winter, 1975-76.
82

See Hagopian, supra note ___, at 102.

83

See Associated Press, May 22, 1974.
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Later in the 1970s, President Carter took numerous steps
against Iranians and Iran in response to the crisis in which U.S.
citizens were held hostage in Teheran.84 In the 1980s, the
Reagan Administration targeted Libya in the name of combating
terrorism. President Reagan in 1986 announced that the U.S.
government had irrefutable evidence that Libyan leader Muammar
Qaddafi was responsible for terrorist attacks at the Rome and
Vienna airports.85 The U.S. navy later that year shot down two
Libyan planes off the coast of Libya. President Reagan announced
that we have the evidence that Qaddafi was sending hit teams to
assassinate Reagan. No evidence has ever been presented that
Qaddafi was behind the terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna or
that any Libyan hit squads had been sent to the United States.86

84

See infra text accompanying notes ___.

85

THE

See NOAM CHOMSKY, PIRATES & EMPERORS: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
REAL WORLD 138-40 (1986).
86

IN

A faction of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) that had broken with Yasser Arafat, was
ultimately found to be responsible for the attacks on the Rome
and Vienna airports.
[T]here [was] not the slightest evidence
to implicate Libya.
CHOMSKY, supra note __, at 5-36. Moreover,
FBI assistant director Oliver Revell later admitted that claims
that Qaddafi had sent assassins to the United States was a
complete fabrication.
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1986.
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Nevertheless, the United States bombed Libya.87 In addition,
vandalism and violence against United States residents of Arab or
Middle Eastern origin and their community centers, mosques,
businesses, and homes followed the public announcements.88

87

See CHOMSKY, supra note __, at 149-50.

88

See Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism, supra note __, 193-94.
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In the 1990s, the U.S. government s war on terrorism
focused on Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein. Characterizing
Hussein as the new Hitler of the Middle East, the Bush
administration accused Iraqi forces of atrocities against
Kuwaitis, many that later proved to be fabricated.89 The FBI
also initiated a nationwide interrogation effort against Arab and
Muslim community leaders, activists, and anti-war
demonstrators.90 Additional policy measures put in place were
nationwide fingerprinting of all residents and immigrants in the
United States of Arab origin, and the institution of a Federal
Aviation Administration system of airline profiling of persons
from the Arab world.91 Private harassment and violence against
89

WHAT UNCLE

See Noam Chomsky, The Gulf War, in THE REAL STORY SERIES:
SAM REALLY WANTS 60-68 (1997).

90

See Domestic Repression and the Persian Gulf War, MSN
NEWS, vol. 7, issue 1, special ed., 1991.
91

See Akram, supra note __, at 52-53; Sharon LaFraniere,
FBI Starts Interviewing Arab-American Leaders, WASH. POST., Jan.
9, 1991, at A14; Emily Sachar, FBI Grills NY Arab-Americans,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1991, at 6; Lisa Belkin, For Many ArabAmericans, FBI Scrutiny Renews Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991;
see also AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1999-2000 REPORT,
supra note __ (reviewing race profiling of Arabs and Muslims on
airplanes); Whidden, supra note __, at 2879-2880 (same).

35

the Arab and Muslim communities followed.92
As this discussion suggests, the federal government s action
against Arab and Muslim groups generally has been followed by
indiscriminate threats and violence against Arabs and Muslims in
the United States. This frightening pattern has continued after
the events of September 11.93

92

See supra note __ (citing reports).

93

See infra text accompanying notes ___.
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Foreign policy has played a large role behind immigration
measures directed at Arabs and Muslims in the United States. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) sought to deport
noncitizens of Palestinian ancestry,94 at the same time that the
federal government attempted to shut down Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) representative offices in the United States95
and at the United Nations.96 In the 1980s, President Reagan
issued a secret National Security Decision Directive that
authorized the creation of the Alien Border Control Committee
designed to prevent terrorists from entering or remaining in
the United States. The Committee considered proposals to
implement a registry and processing procedure to collect
information on noncitizens in the United States. Under one
proposal, intelligence agencies would provide the INS with
names, nationalities and other identifying data and evidence
relating to alien undesirables and suspected terrorists believed
to be in ... the U.S. 97 The Alien Border Control Committee also
considered an INS-created strategy called Alien Terrorists and
Undesirables: A Contingency Plan, 98 which called for use of
ideological exclusion grounds in the immigration laws against
94

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

95

In 1987, Congress enacted an Anti-Terrorism Act which
mandated the closure of the Palestine Information Office (PIO) in
Washington, the official institution representing the PLO in the
United States and the PLO Observer Mission at the United Nations.
Constitutional challenges to the Anti-Terrorism Act failed. See
Palestine Information Office v. Schultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
96

See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization,
695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
97

Legislation to Implement the Recommendations of the
Comm n. on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians:
Hearings on H.R. 442 before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov t
Relations of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 67
(1987) (emphasis added).
98

See MEMORANDUM FROM INVESTIGATIONS DIV., IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERV., ALIEN BORDER CONTROL (ABC) GROUP IV CONTINGENCY PLANS
(Nov. 18, 1986) (with attachments including INS, Alien Terrorists
and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan (1986)) [hereinafter INS
CONTINGENCY PLAN], on file with author.
37

noncitizens only from Arab countries and Iran.99
2.

Efforts to Stifle Political Dissent: The Case of the LA
8

99

See infra text accompanying notes __ (discussing
ideological exclusion grounds). Nationals of Algeria, Libya,
Tunisia, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and Lebanon were targeted
under the plan. See INS CONTINGENCY PLAN, supra note __, at 16.
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Critics long have pointed out that the United States has
discriminated against Arabs and Muslims in applying the terrorist
exclusion provisions of the Immigration & Nationality Act
(INA).100 Arabs, particularly Palestinians, are the primary
groups subject to many of the terrorism provisions,101 as well as
other measures taken in the war on terrorism. During the Gulf
War crisis, for example, government officials fingerprinted and
photographed all entrants of Arab origin
and only Arabs
regardless of past activities or any evidence of terrorist
100

See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, American-Arab
Getting the
Balance Wrong
Again!, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 363-68 (2000)
(analyzing how U.S. government employed ideological exclusions
against Arabs and Muslims); David Cole, Guilt By Association:
It s Alive and Well at the INS, THE NATION, Feb. 15, 1993 (stating
that, at the time, the LA 8 were the only noncitizens that the
INS had ever sought to remove under terrorism provisions of
immigration laws).
101

See Akram, supra note __; Cole, supra note __; Whidden,
supra note __.
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sympathies.102

102

See Sharon LaFraniere & George Lardner, U.S. Set to
Photograph, Fingerprint all New Iraqi and Kuwaiti Visitors, WASH.
POST, Jan. 11, 1991, at A23. The Department of Justice ordered
all immigrants with Iraqi or Kuwaiti passports to be
fingerprinted and photographed. The FBI also interviewed 200
Arab-American business and community leaders under the guise of
uncovering terrorist affiliations. For plans to resurrect
these procedures, see Fingerprinting of Nonimmigrants Designated
by the Attorney General, 58 Fed. Reg. 68, 024 (1993) (Dec. 23,
1993). Such targeted measures, although discriminatory, are
difficult to challenge legally. See infra text accompanying
notes __.
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INS decisions to exclude and deport individuals for their
speech or affiliation were based on provisions in the INA
allowing exclusion and deportation on ideological grounds.103 In
1977, Congress enacted the McGovern Amendment that permitted the
Attorney General to waive the exclusion of any noncitizen that
was based on affiliation with an organization that the U.S.
government designated as terrorist. 104 However, by a variety of
means, consular officers could continue to base exclusion
decisions on ideology.105 In 1979, Congress created a single
103

See INA
212(a)(27)-(29), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(27)-(29)
(1952), as amended 22 U.S.C.
2691; see, e.g., Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d 1111
(1st Cir. 1988); Harvard Law School Forum v. Schultz, 633 F.
Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aff d by equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1
(1987). The ideological exclusion provisions had been the
subject of sustained academic criticism as being inconsistent
with the First Amendment. See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, Aliens in
the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the
McCarren-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (1988); Steven R.
Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political
Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987); Philip Monrad, Comment,
Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. R. REV.
831 (1989). According to INS data, over 8,000 noncitizens were
denied entry into the United States because of their political
beliefs or associations between 1952 and 1984. See Dave
Martella, Comment, Defending the Land of the Free and the Home of
the Fearful: The Use of Classified Information to Deport
Suspected Terrorists, 7 AM. U. J. INT L L. & POL Y 951, 962-63
(1992) (citing INS estimates).
104

22 U.S.C.

2691 (1988).

105

The McGovern Amendment did not eliminate ideological
exclusion for two reasons. First, the waiver only applied to
exclusion under INA
212(a)(28), which permitted consular
officers to exclude noncitizens under the INA
212(a)(27)
ideological exclusion grounds. Second, the waivers were
discretionary and unlikely to be approved without the
recommendation of the State Department. See id.; Keisha A. Gary,
Congressional Proposals to Revive Guilt by Association: An
Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 237
(1994). A later version of the McGovern Amendment was codified
as 22 U.S.C.
2691 (1988) by the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204,
901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400
41

exception to the McGovern Amendment that permitted exclusion of
officials or representatives of the PLO.106

(1987). This version, however, kept the PLO exception. This
temporary provision later was made permanent, see Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-246,
128(1), 104
Stat. 15, 30 (1990), before removal of most of the ideological
exclusion provisions by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-649,
601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5071 (1990).
106

any

The exception stated that the waiver is inapplicable to
officials [or] representatives ... of the PLO.
Id.
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The years of federal government efforts to remove the LA 8"
shows the extremes to which it will resort in order to remove
political dissidents from the country.107 The case began before
dawn on January 26, 1987, when FBI, INS and Los Angeles police
officers descended on the Los Angeles home of Khader Hamide, a
U.S. lawful permanent resident, and his Kenyan-born wife Julie
Mungai.108 The couple were handcuffed, told they were being
arrested for terrorism, and taken into custody while police
blocked the street and an FBI helicopter hovered overhead.109 Six
107

See Johnson, Antiterrorism, supra note __, at 865-69.
For consideration of this case from different vantage points, see
William C. Banks, The L.A. Eight and Investigation of Terrorist
Threats in the United States, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 479
(2000); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Nativism, Terrorism,
and Human Rights -- The Global Wrongs of Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521
(2000); Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases
After AADC: Lessons From Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385
(2000); Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and
the First Amendment after Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313
(2000); Wing, supra note __.
108

The published decisions in the case include Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999);
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 170 F.3d 1264
(9th Cir. 1999); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno,
132 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1997); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997); American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995);
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d
501 (9th Cir. 1991); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Nelson, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991); American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Meese 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
109

For detailed descriptions of the arrests, detentions
and proceedings against the LA 8, see Akram, supra note __, at
73; William Overend & Ronald L. Soble, 7 Tied to PLO Terrorist
Wing Seized by INS, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1987; see also JAMES
DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY __ (1999) (discussing LA 8
case); Susan M. Akram, Historic Court Decision Protects First
Amendment Rights of Dissident Aliens, 18 IMMIGRATION NEWSLETTER
(Nat l Immigration Project of Nat l Lawyers Guild, spring 1989)
(same).
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other individuals were arrested that morning as part of the
sweep.

Information provided by the ADL triggered the FBI
investigation of the Los Angeles 8. See supra text accompanying
notes ____ (discussing ADL s surveillance efforts).
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The INS sought to remove the LA 8 from the United States
based on political ideology. Both the director of the FBI and
the regional counsel of the INS testified to Congress that the
sole basis of the government s efforts to deport the LA 8 was
their political affiliations. In the words of FBI director
William Webster, [a]ll of them were arrested because they are
alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist organization
which under the [INA] makes them eligible for deportation .... If
these individuals had been United States citizens, there would
not have been a basis for their arrest. 110 The evidence
underlying the government s charges amounted to a claim that the
LA 8 read or distributed pro-Palestinian literature linked to the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The
district court found that the ideological exclusion grounds
violated the First Amendment.111

110

Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on Nomination of William Webster to be Director of
Central Intelligence, 100th Cong. 94-95 (1987) (testimony of FBI
Director William Webster); see DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note ___, at
35.
111

See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese
714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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In 1990 while the LA 8 case was pending, Congress repealed
the ideological exclusions from the immigration laws.112 The INS
then instituted new proceedings against the LA 8 based on
nonideological grounds, including the addition of new terrorism
charges. The INA permits removal of noncitizens who have engaged
in terrorist activity, which is defined as committing in an
individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of
terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows or reasonably
should know, affords material support to any individual,
organization or government in conducting a terrorist activity at
any time .... 113 This broad language authorizes the INS to
deport or exclude an individual who has donated money to an
organization for its legal, social, or charitable activities if
any arm of that organization also has engaged in terrorism.114
The thrust of the INS case was based on the LA 8's affiliation
with the PFLP, a PLO-splinter organization, which he district
court found was engaged in a wide range of lawful activities,
from providing education, health care, social services and day
care, to cultural and political activities. Because this
provision had never previously been used to seek to deport anyone
from the United States, the LA 8 challenged the selective
112

See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649
601(a), 101 Stat. 4978, 5071 (1990), amending Immigration &
Nationality Act (INA)
212(a), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a).
113

See INA
212(a)(4)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(4)(B)(iii)(1990).
114

See infra text accompanying notes __ (discussing
breadth of definition of terrorist activity in immigration
laws). The United States Code includes a number of definitions
of terrorist activity for law enforcement, surveillance, and
other purposes. The INA broadly defines terrorist activity for
purposes of the immigration laws. See, e.g., INA
212(a)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (listing terrorist
activities without intent or political motivation requirements).
The USA PATRIOT Act expands the definition of terrorist
activity.
See infra text accompanying notes __. For criticism
of the definition of terrorist activity in the INA, see Neuman,
supra note __; Susan Dente Ross, In the Shadow of Terror: The
Illusive First Amendment Rights of Aliens, 6 COMM. L. & POL Y 76
(2001); Nadine Strossen, When and How: Criticisms of Federal
Counter-Terrorism Laws, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 51 (1997);
Whidden, supra note __.
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enforcement of the immigration laws in retaliation for their
exercise of protected First Amendment rights.115 In the end, the
Supreme Court held that noncitizens unlawfully in the United
States have no general constitutional right to assert selective
enforcement as a defense to deportation.116 The Court ruled that
the 1996 amendments to the immigration laws limiting judicial
review, barred judicial review of their claim.117
The INS continues to seek to deport the LA 8. The INS has
opposed their applications for relief from removal of two of the
LA 8 on the basis of secret evidence.118
3.

The Secret Evidence Cases

115

See supra note __ (citing authorities). The FBI had
conducted a three and a half year investigation against the LA 8
before turning the case over to the INS for lack of evidence for
a criminal prosecution. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note __, at 3738.
116

See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999); infra text accompanying notes __
(discussing implications of this Supreme Court decision for
challenges of selective enforcement).
117

See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, 525 U.S. at 471. In reaching that conclusion, the
Court relied on INA
242(g), 8 U.S.C.
1252(g), which provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.
118

Following the Court s decision, the case was remanded
to the immigration court. In 2001, the court dismissed the
primary removal charges on the grounds that they were not meant
to apply retroactively to acts
participating in demonstrations,
distributing newspapers, and fund-raising for humanitarian
projects for a group classified by the U.S. government as a
terrorist organization
committed before Congress enacted the
removal grounds. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 86 (3d ed. 2002).
47

The INS continues to seek to deport the INS has selectively
targeted Arabs and Muslims through the use of secret evidence -evidence that it refuses to disclose to the noncitizen or his
counsel -- to charge, detain, and deny bond in removal
proceedings. Until recent years, the use of secret evidence by
law enforcement agencies and INS has been extremely rare.119 The
federal government brought over thirty secret evidence cases
between 1987 and September 11, 2001, with two dozen being
litigated between 1996 and 2001.120

119

See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); Jay v. Boyd, 350
U.S. 931 (1956); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950); United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953).
120

See Akram, supra note __, at 52 n.4.
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In Rafeedie v. INS,121 Fouad Rafeedie, a 20-year lawful
permanent resident of Palestinian origin, was arrested on
returning to the United States after a two week trip to a
conference in Syria sponsored by the Palestine Youth
Organization. He was placed in summary exclusion proceedings
the first time such proceedings had ever been used against a
lawful permanent resident
based on ideological exclusion
grounds.122 Seeking to exclude Rafeedie without a hearing and
without revealing its evidence to him, the INS claimed that
disclosing its evidence against Rafeedie would be prejudicial to
the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security
of the United States. 123 The court of appeals rejected the INS
positions and mandated application of the normal due process
analysis in deciding whether the federal government s national
security interests outweighed Rafeedie s First Amendment
rights.124 The court stated that the only way Rafeedie could
prevail would be if he can rebut the undisclosed evidence
against him . . . . It is difficult to imagine how even someone
innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden. 125
121

See Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988),
aff d in part, rev d in part, remanded, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
122

See INA
212(a)(27-29), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(27-29);
supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing ideological
exclusions).
123

Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 734.

124

See id.

125

Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 516.
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Following repeal of the ideological exclusions in 1990,126
the INS used secret evidence to detain and deport Arabs and
Muslims. In response to the 1993 Oklahoma City bombings,
Congress enacted anti-terrorism legislation that has facilitated
the targeting of Muslim and Arab noncitizens. In 1996, Congress
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)127 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),128 which brought about radical
changes to the immigration laws,129 and effectively allowed for
ideological exclusion and removal.130
Bolstered by the 1996 reforms curtailing the rights of
noncitzens, the INS initiated approximately two dozen deportation
proceedings on the basis of secret evidence, claiming that it
would compromise the security of the United States.131 Although
126

See supra text accompanying notes __.

127

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter
AEDPA]; see Whidden, supra note __, at 2841-83 (summarizing
genesis of AEDPA and analyzing its impact on Arabs and Muslims).
128

Pub. L. No. 104-208, Title III, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).

129

See infra text accompanying notes __.

130

See infra note __ (citing authorities on breadth of the
terrorist activity provisions of the INA). For discussion of
the use of these provisions to target Arabs and Muslims, see
Scanlan, supra note __; Ross, supra note __.
131

See Akram, supra note __ 52 n.4 (listing noncitizens
involved in post-1996 secret evidence cases and noting that all
known cases involved Arabs or Muslims); see also Martin Schwartz,
Niels Frenzen, & Mayra L. Calo, Recent Developments in the INS s
Use of Secret Evidence Against Aliens, in 2001-02 IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK 300 (2001) (discussing secret evidence
cases). Many important decisions in these cases were made by the
immigration courts, which do not publish their decisions.
Citations to the cases below are from immigration court decisions
and related materials. Court documents in the cases discussed
below are on file with Kit Gage, National coordinator of the
National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom, 3321 12th
Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20017 cases).
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denying that it selectively uses secret evidence against Arabs
and Muslims, the INS has been unable to point to a single secret
evidence case not involving an Arab or Muslim noncitizen.132

132

See Testimony of INS General Counsel Paul Virtue on
Oct. 8, 1998, The National Security Considerations Involved in
Asylum Applications: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information,
105th Cong., at 5-14 (FDCH Political Transcripts).

51

AEDPA established a special procedure for detaining and
deporting alien terrorists that permitted the use of secret
evidence with certain procedural safeguards.133 The INS, however,
has not yet used the new procedures.134 The INS instead has
relied on pre-existing regulations authorizing the use of secret
evidence in the immigration courts.135 By so doing, the INS
avoids conforming the procedural safeguards in AEDPA, such as
producing an unclassified summary of the secret evidence to the
alien, having a federal judge assess the constitutionality of the
use of secret evidence, and charging the noncitizen under a
substantive terrorism provision of law, which would require the
133

Title IV of AEDPA addresses suspected alien
terrorists.
AEDPA
401 established new procedures for deciding
the admissibility or removability of suspected terrorists. It
defines an alien terrorist as any alien who has engaged, is
engaged, or at any time after admission engages in any terrorist
activity, including an act that affords material support to
[any person or group] . . . conducting a terrorist activity.
AEDPA
401 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
1531(1), 1227(a)(4)(B),
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)). AEDPA
302 authorizes the Secretary of
State to designate a foreign terrorist organization.
A
foreign terrorist organization is (a) a foreign organization;
(b) engaging in terrorist activity (as defined under 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(B)); (c) that threatens the security of the U.S. or
its citizens. AEDPA
302 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
1189(a)(1)
(Supp. V 2000)).
Section 401 created a special removal court for alien
terrorists that gives the special court the power to examine,
ex parte and in camera, any evidence for which the Attorney
General determines that public disclosure would pose a risk to
the national security of the United States or to the security of
any individual because it would disclose classified information.
AEDPA
401 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
1534(e)(3)(A)); see also
Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and
Secret Deportation Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL Y REV. 23 (1996)
(analyzing proposed secret evidence proceedings in AEDPA).
134

At the time of the publication of this article, the
special terrorist removal court has never been used. See 78
INTERPRETER RELEASES 363 (Feb. 12, 2001).
135

See 8 C.F.R.

240.33(c)(4).
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government to sustain its burden of proof.136
The secret evidence cases pursued by the INS reflect the
selective targeting of Arabs and Muslims. The cases of the
Iraqi 7 arose out of the U.S. government s resettlement of
6,000 Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War. Brought as refugees for
resettlement to the United States,137 the Iraqi men had been
recruited by the U.S. government to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and
were later airlifted out of Iraq with their families when the
attempt failed.138 The Iraqi 7" were placed in exclusion
proceedings for entering without valid visas, and then held in
detention as security risks ... against the United States. 139
Claiming that the evidence supporting the security risk
allegations was classified, the INS would not reveal it.140 The
immigration court reviewed the secret evidence and ordered the

136

See Akram, supra note __, at 72 (reviewing AEDPA s
procedural protections in terrorist court).
137

For a summary of the Iraqi 7 cases by the counsel for
the noncitizens, see Neils Frenzen, National Security and
Procedural Fairness: Secret Evidence and the Immigration Laws, 76
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1677 (Nov. 22, 1999).
138

See id.

139

See id.

140

See id.
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men excluded.141

141

See id.
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James Woolsey, the former Director of the CIA who directed
the U.S. government s efforts to organize the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein, was one of the lawyers representing the Iraqis. The
government denied him access to the secret evidence, claiming
that it did not trust him to keep the information confidential.142
The INS ultimately released 500 pages of the evidence. Besides
concluding that hundreds of pages had been erroneously
classified, Woolsey found that the evidence was based on serious
errors in Arabic-English translations, ethnic and religious
stereotyping by the FBI, and reliance on unreliable information,
including rumors and innuendo. Woolsey pointed out that either
INS counsel or intelligence agents made significant false
statements to the immigration judge.143 Despite the weakness of
the government s case, the case was only concluded when five of
the Iraqis entered into a settlement agreement withdrawing their
pending asylum claims in order to obtain release from
142

See id.

143

See The National Security Considerations Involved in
Asylum Applications: Hearings Before the Tech., Terrorism and
Gov t Information Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong., at 23-37 (1998) (statement of James R. Woolsey).
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detention.144

They had been detained for two years.145

144

See Frenzen, supra note __.

145

See id.
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Mazen al-Najjar and Anwar Haddam experienced the longest
detention in secret evidence proceedings; Al-Najjar was initially
held for three and a half years,146 and Haddam for four years.147
Al-Najjar, a stateless Palestinian, was the editor-in-chief of a
research journal of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise
(WISE), a think-tank based at the University of South Florida
devoted to dialogue on issues related to the Middle East.148 The
INS arrested Al-Najjar and placed him in removal proceedings in
1997 as part of an FBI investigation against a former
administrator of WISE who became head of the Islamic Jihad. The
arrest and detention was based on secret evidence.149
Anwar Haddam was an elected member of the Algerian
Parliament.150 A Professor of Physics at the University of
Algiers, he ran for election on the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
platform.151 The FIS, a moderate Islamic party, swept the 1991
elections by 80% of the popular vote. The Algerian military
staged a coup d etat, arrested the president of the FIS, and
rounded up thousands of FIS members. Top FIS officials were
killed or imprisoned; thousands of FIS supporters were

146

See FBI Terror Probes Focus on Muslim, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 1998, at A1.
147

See In re Anwar Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20, at 1 (BIA
Dec. 1, 2000); see also Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp.2d 402 (D.
N.J. 1999) (ordering release of Palestinian detained for one-anda-half years based on secret evidence).
148

See Al-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir.
2001); Al-Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
For discussion of various developments in the Al-Najjar case, see
77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1747 (Dec. 18, 2000); 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1712 (Dec. 11, 2000); 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1566 (Nov. 6, 2000);
77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 9377 (July 17, 2000). The U.S. government
later re-arrested and detained Al-Najjar after September 11. See
infra text accompanying notes ___.
149

See Al-Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1333-35.

150

See Akram, supra note __, at 79-81 (analyzing case); In
re Anwar Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20 (BIA Dec. 1, 2000).
151

See In re Haddam, supra note __, at 6.
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imprisoned, tortured, and executed.152 A civil war followed with
tens of thousands of deaths resulting.153 One of the few elected
FIS officials who managed to escape Algeria, Haddam entered the
United States legally on a valid nonimmigrant visa in 1992 and
later filed an asylum claim.154 The INS took Haddam into custody
and detained him based on secret evidence.155
152

See id. at 9.

153

See id.

154

See id.

155

See id. at 7.

The INS also opposed Haddam s asylum

58

In both the Al-Najjar and Haddam cases, as the secret
evidence has either been unclassified or disclosed, it is evident
that the government s terrorist claims were based on unreliable
evidence.156 Both were released after years of detention.

claim, stating that he was barred from asylum as a persecutor of
others and rested its position primarily on evidence it
maintained was classified and would not produce in court. See
Immigration & Nationality Act
208(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.
208(b)(2)(A)(i).
156

See In re Haddam, No. A22-751-813 (BIA Sept. 10, 1998),
aff d, In re Anwar Haddam, supra note __.
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Nasser Ahmed also was held in custody and denied bond for
three years based on secret evidence.157 An Egyptian native,
Ahmed was a court-appointed translator for the legal defense team
of Sheik Abdel Rahman for the conspiracy to bomb the World Trade
Center in New York City in 1996.158 During the trial, FBI and INS
agents tried to convince Ahmed that he should assist in the
Rahman investigation and threatened him with deportation if he
refused to cooperate.159 Ahmed would not assist the government.
The INS arrested and detained him and opposed Ahmed s asylum
claim based on the secret evidence.160 Losing his case in the
immigration court based on secret evidence, Ahmed filed a habeas
corpus petition.161 After the INS released some of its secret
157

See Matter of Nasser Ahmed, No. A90-674-238
(Immigration Court June 24, 1999). The BIA denied Ahmed s appeal
seeking a bond redetermination. See In re Nasser Ahmed, No. 90674-238 (BIA Sept. 1996); see also DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note __,
at 128-31 (discussing case).
158

See infra text accompanying notes __.

159

See Matter of Nasser Ahmed, supra note __.

160

See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note __, at 129.

161

See In re Nasser Ahmed, No. 90-674-238 (BIA Sept.

1996).
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evidence, Ahmed refuted it. On remand, the immigration court
dismissed the evidence underlying the government s remaining
contentions on the grounds that it was based on a primary
informant who had personal reasons for desiring Ahmed s
deportation.162
As the secret evidence cases have slowly worked their way
through the judicial process, the government s claims in all the
cases have evaporated. None of the cases included sufficient
evidence of terrorism-related charges necessary to justify the
years of detention.163 Besides the individual loss of liberty,
the cases have chilled Arab and Muslim political speech.
4.

Conclusion

162

In re Nasser Ahmed, at 7 (N.Y. EOIR, Immigration Court,
July 30, 1999) (decision following remand).
163

See Akram, supra note __; Frenzen, supra note __.
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This section generally illustrates how stereotypes about
Arabs and Muslims have influenced immigration law and its
enforcement, as well as the civil rights of Arab and Muslim
noncitizens in the United States. This discussion is by no means
comprehensive. Other examples of the laws responding to
perceived fears of Arab and Muslim terrorism are plentiful. For
example, in the 1990s, the much-publicized case of asylum seeker
Sheik Omar Rahman, later convicted for his involvement in the
1993 World Trade Center bombing,164 almost by itself resulted in
changes to the immigration laws narrowing the rights of all
asylum applicants. An episode on the popular television show 60
Minutes 165 focusing on his alleged abuse of the asylum system
triggered a chain reaction culminating in 1996 asylum reforms,
including a summary exclusion procedure by which a noncitizen
could be excluded from the country without a hearing on an asylum
or other claim to relief.166
164

See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 982 (2000). For reference to how
racist stereotypes
terrorist Arabs out to destroy American
democracy
posed challenges to the defense, see Binny Miller,
Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 561 (1994).
165

See PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL
BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 42-44, 134, 137, 148, 162,
164, 217 (2000); 60 Minutes: How Did He Get Here? (CBS Television
broadcast, Mar. 14, 1993).
166

AND

See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
POLICY 863-71, 1028-29 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing summary
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exclusion provisions of 1996 immigration reforms).
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Part I analyzed how the demonization of Arabs and Muslims
has impacted the evolution of the law and encouraged harsh
governmental efforts to remove Arabs and Muslims from the United
States.167 This section analyzes how the same stereotypes have
affected the civil rights of all persons of Arab and Muslim
ancestry in the United States since September 11, 2001.168 The
aftermath of the various national security measures promise to
have enduring impacts on the civil rights of all minority groups
in the United States.
1.

The Immediate Impacts

167

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

168

See infra text accompanying notes ___.
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The federal government responded with ferocity to the events
of September 11. Hundreds of Arab and Muslim noncitizens were
rounded up as material witnesses in the ongoing investigation
of the terrorism or detained on relatively minor immigration
violations.169 The dragnet provoked criticism as a poor law
enforcement technique as well as a major intrusion on fundamental
civil liberties.170 Congress swiftly passed the USA PATRIOT
Act,171 which, among other things, allowed the government to
detain suspected noncitizen terrorists for up to a week without
charges, and bolstered federal law enforcement surveillance
powers over citizens, as well as immigrants, associated with
terrorism.
President Bush s controversial military order
allowing alleged noncitizen terrorists, including those arrested
in the United States, to be tried in military courts with the
accused guaranteed few rights, provoked a firestorm of
controversy.172 Proposed regulations issued in November 2001 in
response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Zadvydas v.
Davis173 holding that indefinite detention of noncitizens ordered
removed from the country was not authorized by law, include an
exception permitting indefinite detention of noncitizens for
terrorism and national security reasons.174 Attorney General
169

See infra text accompanying notes ___ (analyzing in
detail federal law enforcement response to September 11 events,
including a massive dragnet directed at Muslims).
170

See Jim McGee, Ex-FBI Officials Criticize Tactics on
Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1; Lawrence, supra note
__.
171

Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001).
172

See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833
(Nov. 16, 2001).
173

533 U.S. 678 (2001).

174

See 66 Fed. Reg. 56967, 56979-80 (Nov. 14, 2001)
(discussing 8 C.F.R.
241.14(d)). The Court suggested that this
might be constitutionally permissible. See Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct.
at 2502 ( Neither do we consider terrorism or other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of
preventative detention and for heightened deference to the
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of
65

Ashcroft issued an interim rule allowing electronic surveillance
of attorney-client communications with detained terrorists. 175

national security. ). For criticism of the proposed regulation,
see Immigrant Rights Clinic, Administrative Comment: Indefinite
Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8
C.F.R.
287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397 (2000/01).
175

See 66 Fed. Reg. 55062 (Oct. 31, 2001); Neil A. Lewis &
Christopher Marquis, Larger Visa Waits for Arabs; Stir Over U.S.
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A1; George Lardner
Jr., U.S. Will Monitor Calls to Lawyers, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001,
at A1.
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To the extent that the U.S. responses to September 11 can be
characterized as regulating immigration, the law affords
considerable leeway to the political branches of the federal
government. The Supreme Court has upheld racial, national
origin, political, and other forms of discrimination against
noncitizens in the immigration laws that would patently violate
the Constitution if the rights of citizens were implicated.176
The so-called plenary power doctrine creates a constitutional
immunity from judicial scrutiny of substantive immigration
judgments of Congress and the Executive Branch.177 Immigration
law, in which the powers of the U.S. government are at their
zenith, thus allows the federal government to lash out at the
particular undesirable groups of the day.178 Such authority
increases exponentially when, as in the case of international
terrorism, perceived foreign relations and national security
176

See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping
v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding racial
discrimination in immigration laws); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1952) (allowing for deportation of immigrants based
on their political views); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001) (upholding gender discrimination in citizenship laws);
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471
(1999) (holding that courts lacked authority to review claim of
selective enforcement of immigration laws by Muslim noncitizens);
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding
that President s policy of interdicting Haitians fleeing
political violence on high seas and returning them to Haiti
without hearing asylum and other claims did not violate domestic
or international law).
177

But see Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power
Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But
Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
257 (2000) (questioning whether plenary power doctrine in fact
protects immigration laws form constitutional scrutiny).
178

See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, The Immigration Laws, and
Domestic Race Relations: A Magic Mirror Into the Heart of
Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998) (analyzing use of immigration
laws to adversely affect racial minorities); Johnson,
Antiterrorism, supra note __ (same for political minorities);
Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The
Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class,
42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995) (same for poor and working people).
67

matters are at issue.179 As history teaches, with immigration law
and its enforcement firmly in the hands of the federal
government,180 uniform, national civil rights deprivations may
result.181
179

See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425
(1999) (stating that we have recognized that judicial deference
to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
immigration context where officials `exercise especially
sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations ) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988));
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976) ( `[A]ny policy
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican
form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to
the political branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference. ) (quoting Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (footnote omitted)); see
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J.
1255 (1988). Such deference combines with that ordinarily
accorded agency action to create a most potent form of deference
to the Executive Branch s immigration decisions. See AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. at 423-24 (relying on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1974)); INS v. Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (stating that
agency fact-finding could be reversed only if the evidence
presented . . . was such that a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.
(citation omitted); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the
"Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch
Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413 (1993) (analyzing
the impact of deference to agency action in Supreme Court s
immigration decisions).
180

See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ( Power
to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal
power. ) (citations omitted); see also League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (1995) (holding
that most of Proposition 187, California law seeking to regulate
undocumented immigration, was pre-empted by federal law). But
see Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note __ (contending that
states should have greater role in regulating immigration).
181

See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, MAKING
68

AND
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1.

The Dragnet

THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990 (1993) (analyzing how
exclusionary federal immigration laws adversely affected Asian
Americans); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1996) (analyzing law in
place from 1790-1952 requiring that alien be white in order to
naturalize). Alternatively, the federal government can act
nationally to protect civil rights of noncitizens against conduct
by the federal government. See supra text accompanying notes
___.
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The events of September 11, 2001 understandably provoked an
immediate and ferocious federal governmental response.
Heightened security measures were the first order of the day.
Within a matter of weeks, the U.S. government arrested and
detained over 1,200 Arab and Muslim immigrants.182 The mass
dragnet of Arab and Muslim men from many nations, with the
largest numbers from Pakistan and Egypt, apparently has failed to
produce any direct links to the terrorists acts; about one
hundred were charged with minor crimes and another 500 were held
in custody on immigration-related matters, such as having
overstayed their temporary nonimmigrant visas.183 Attorney
182

See David E. Rovella, Clock Ticks on 9/11 Detentions,
NAT L L.J., Nov. 5, 2001, at A1; A Deliberate Strategy of
Disruption, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A01; Lois Romano & David
S. Fallis, Questions Swirl Around Men Held in Terror Probe, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 2001, at A01. One Pakistani man died in federal
custody under mysterious circumstances. See Guy Gugliotta,
Pakistani Held After Sept. 11 Attacks Dies in Cell, WASH. POST,
Oct. 25, 2001, at A18.
183

See DOJ Orders Incentives, `Voluntary Interviews of
Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816,
1817 (Dec. 3, 2001); Josh Meyer, The Investigation: The Dragnet
Produces Few Terrorist Ties, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1; see
also Greg Smith & Joe Calderone, No Big Fish in 9/11 Dragnet,
DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 30, 2001, at 6 ( The dragnet that
swept through New York in search of terrorists in the days after
Sept. 11 scraped up mostly a handful of small-time hustlers and
hapless immigrants with visa problems. ). The first indictment
for conspiracy in the hijackings was of a noncitizen in federal
custody for immigration violations on September 11. See David
Johnston & Philip Shenon, Man Held in Custody Since August is
Charged With a Role in Sept. 11 Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2001, at A1.
Information remains sketchy about the persons detained
because the Attorney General has refused to release specific
information about them, prompting criticism by U.S. Senator
Russell Feingold, see Russ Feingold, Name the Detainees, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 2001, at B07, and a Freedom of Information Act
lawsuit, see Rights Groups Sue DOJ, INS for Information on Those
Detained or Arrested Following September 11, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES
5 (Jan. 2, 2002). Information produced in response to the
litigation shows that the handling of Muslims arrested on
immigration charges after Sept. 11 has been fraught with delay
70

General John Ashcroft admitted that minor immigration charges
would be used to hold noncitizens while the criminal
investigation continues.184

and sloppy bookkeeping and that dues process was shortchanged . .
. .
Jim Edwards, Data Show Shoddy Due Process for Post-Sept. 11
Immigration Detainees, N.J. L.J., Feb. 6, 2002.
184

See Immigrant Rights Clinic, supra note __, at 414
(collecting Ashcroft s public statements).
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The nature and conditions of the initial wave of mass
arrests and detentions warrant consideration. Arab and Muslim
detainees were held for weeks without any charges filed against
them and without being provided basic information about why
federal authorities continued to detain them.185 The U.S.
government, for example, held Dr. Al-Badr Al-Hazmi, a radiologist
who had lived as a lawful permanent resident for years with his
family in San Antonio, for two weeks in large part because he
shared the same last name
a common one in Saudi Arabia -- with
two of the September 11 hijackers.186 The U.S. government
arrested and held a Yemeni immigrant for two months who was
interrogated and threatened, before being released without being
charged.187 One Muslim student was arrested for visa problems and
held in a local jail in Mississippi, where as police watched he
was beaten by other prisoners for being a terrorist.188 An
Egyptian computer engineering student was wrongly detained for
over three weeks and charged with lying to federal investigators
about ownership of an aviation radio allegedly recovered in his
hotel room, which (as it turned out) in fact did not belong to
him.189 Not surprisingly given the tenor of the times, there was
virtually no real public outcry about the mass arrests.190
185

See Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, Justice Kept in the
Dark, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 37. In addition, after
September 11, the immigration courts began holding secret
hearings in immigration cases of noncitizens as part of the
criminal investigation. See William Glaberson, Closed
Immigration Hearings Criticized as Prejudicial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 2001, at B7.
186

See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note ___, at 42.

187

See Susan Milligan, Fighting Terror/The Detainees
Testimony; Yemeni Immigrant Says He Was Abused, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
5, 2001, at A13.
188

See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note ___, at 39-40

189

See June Fritsch, Grateful Egyptian is Freed as U.S.
Terror Case Fizzles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A1.
The case
began to unravel . . . , when the real owner of the radio, a
private pilot and American citizen, came forward to claim it. He
had left it in his room . . . of the hotel. Id.
190

Indeed, in Attorney General Ashcroft s testimony before
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, he lambasted critics of the
72

The dragnet did not end there. The Justice Department also
sought to interview about 5000 men -- almost all of them Arab or
Muslim -- between the ages of 18-33 who had arrived on
nonimmigrant visas in the United States since January 1, 2000.191
Bush administration s anti-terrorism policies as aiding the
terrorist cause. See Excerpts from Attorney General s Testimony
Before Senate Judiciary Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2002, at
B6.
191

See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note __, at 43; DOJ Orders
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There was no evidence that any of the 5000 had been involved in
terrorist activities. Although technically voluntary, 192 the
interviews with law enforcement authorities undoubtedly felt
compulsory to many. Arab and Muslim fears of detention and
deportation193 were reinforced by the November 2001 arrest and
Incentives, `Voluntary Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on
Terrorists, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816, 1817 (Dec. 3, 2001).
192

See Administration Defends Military Commissions, Other
Antiterrorism Measures During Senate Hearing, 78 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1809, 1810 (Dec. 3, 2001) (summarizing congressional
testimony of Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff that
interviews were voluntary and based not on race profiles but on
the fact that al Qaeda terrorist group recruits from specific
nations and encourages use of certain visas).
193

See Tim Jones, Interview Requests Chill U.S. Arabs,
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threatened deportation of Mazen Al-Najjar, who had previously
been held on secret evidence and released after the government
failed to provide any evidence that Al-Najjar was engaged in
terrorist activity.194
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2001, at 1; Tom Kenworthy, Arabs Fear that
Cooperation Could be Costly, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2001, at 4A.
194

See Al Najjar Again in INS Detention Due to Alleged
Terrorist Ties, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1859 (Dec. 10, 2001);
Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; It Can Happen Here, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2001, at A27; see also supra text accompanying notes __
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(discussing Al-Najjar s detention based on secret evidence).
Under the immigration laws, terrorist activity is defined
broadly to include donations of funds to the humanitarian
activities of a terrorist organization.
See Johnson,
Antiterrorism, supra note __, at 866-67 (analyzing breadth of INA
213(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii)); supra text
accompanying notes __ (discussing breadth of definition); see
also Neuman, supra note __, at 322-37 (contrasting various
definitions of terrorist activity ).
76

The questioning of Muslims could be expected to alienate the
noncitizens interviewed. A memorandum from the Office of the
U.S. Deputy Attorney General offered detailed instructions on
information to be solicited, and mentioned that the U.S.
government should be informed if an interviewee was suspected of
being in the country in violation of the immigration laws.195
This shows an effort to remove Arabs and Muslims from the country
based on immigration law violations wholly unrelated to
terrorism, as part of the war on terrorism.196
195

See Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Guidelines
for the Interviews Regarding International Terrorism, Nov. 9,
2001, reprinted in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1829 (Dec. 3, 2001)
(Appendix I).
196

To this end, the federal government detained Arabs and
Muslims held for immigration violations pending deportation as a
symbolic gesture to show that the U.S. government is getting

77

tough on immigration enforcement. See Testimony of Margaret H.
Taylor, Professor of Wake Forest, University School of Law,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, FED. DOC.
CLEARINGHOUSE, Dec. 19, 2001.
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The questions suggested that the Arab and Muslim community
was prone to disloyalty. One line of questioning was as follows:
You should ask the individual if he noticed anybody who reacted
in a surprising or inappropriate way to the news of the September
11th attacks. You should ask him how he felt when he heard the
news. 197 This tracks questions reportedly asked by federal
investigators soon after the bombing. At that time, the FBI
asked persons of Arab ancestry the following:
How do you feel about what happened last week in New York?
Does it make you sad?
Does it make you happy?
Does it make you angry?
How do you feel about being American?
How do you feel about being an Arab?
Why is it that America is considered the enemy?198

197

___, at 4.

See Office of the Deputy Attorney General, supra note

198

Gina Keating, ACLU Faults FBI for Aggressive
Questioning, DAILY RECORDER (Sacramento), Sept. 26, 2001, at 1, 7.
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Despite the criticism, legal support may exist for the
dragnet. In Brown v. City of Oneonta,199 a crime victim
identified a young African American man as the perpetrator of a
burglary and assault who, while committing the crime, cut himself
with a knife; the police attempted to question all African
American students at the local university and over the next
several days, the police conducted a `sweep of Oneonta, stopping
and questioning non-white persons on the streets and inspecting
their hands for cuts. More than two hundred persons were
questioned during that period, but no suspect was apprehended.
The court of appeals held that, although the police employed an
old-fashioned dragnet like those police techniques long condemned
as overbroad and over-inclusive,200 the sweep did not violate the
199

221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 44 (2001).
200

See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 351 (1949); see,
e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (reversing rape
conviction in which African American man was detained and
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Equal Protection Clause.201

Oneonta offers legal justification

fingerprinted, along with over twenty other African Americans, in
violation of Fourth Amendment).
201

See Oneonta, 221 F.3d at 337 ( Plaintiffs do not allege
that upon hearing that a violent crime had been committed, the
police used an established profile of violent criminals to
determine that the suspect must have been black. Nor do they
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for the federal government s Arab and Muslim dragnet even though
law enforcement in both instances arguably relied excessively on
race in a criminal investigation.202 Besides the fact that the
alleged perpetrators of the terrorist acts were Muslim, another
consideration
the need to establish a discriminatory intent
would make it difficult to prevail on an Equal Protection
claim.203

allege that the defendant law enforcement agencies have a regular
policy based upon racial stereotypes that all black . . .
residents be questioned whenever a violent crime is reported. ).
202

See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect
Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1075, 1090-92 (2001).
203

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The
academic challenges to the intent requirement are legion. See,
e.g., Lawrence, supra note __; Haney-Lopez, supra note __.
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Muslims allegedly perpetrated the terrorism of September 11
and a few Arab and Muslim noncitizens might have information
about terrorist networks. The dragnet directed at all Arabs and
Muslims, however, is contrary to fundamental notions of equality
and the individualized suspicion ordinarily required for a stop
under the Fourth Amendment.204 It exemplifies the excessive
reliance on race in the criminal investigation, a frequent law
enforcement problem,205 and shows how, once race (at least of
nonwhites) enters the process, it can come to predominate the
investigatory process. To target an entire minority group across
the country for questioning is obviously over-inclusive. Over
one million persons of Arab ancestry in the United States,206 all
who may feel threatened and under suspicion, cannot miss the nottoo-subtle message sent by the federal government.
In important ways, the September 11 dragnet employed by the
federal government resembles the Japanese internment during World
War II.207 Statistical probabilities, not individualized
suspicion, resulted in action directed at a discrete and insular
minority who have been classified as an alien enemy. 208
National identity and loyalty are defined in part by foreign
appearance, ambiguous as that may be.209 In some ways, the
204

See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)
205

See Banks, supra note __.

206

See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Profile of Selected
Social Characteristics: 2000
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/TTable?ds_name=ACS_C2SS_EST_
G00_)(visited Dec. 10, 2001).
207

See supra text accompanying notes __; see also KENNETH
L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 91 (1989) ( One of the saddest lessons
of Korematsu is that we do not seem to learn much from the
lessons of the past. )
208

See United States v. Carolene Prods, 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) (holding that heightened level of scrutiny of
classifications affecting discrete and insular minorities might
be justified because of deficiencies of political process).
209

ness

See WU, supra note __, at 79-129; Keith Aoki Foreign& Asian American Identities: Yellowface, Wold War II
83

current treatment of Arabs and Muslims is more extralegal than
the internment. There is no Executive Order at issue governing
the treatment of Arabs and Muslims, or a formal declaration of
war.210

Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotype, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 1 (1997); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike:
Citizenship, Foreignness, and Racial Hierarchy in American
Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997). Given the diversity of
appearance in these communities, the very concept of Arab and
Muslim appearance is a misnomer. See SHAHEEN, supra note __, at
4; MICHAEL SULEIMAN, ARABS IN AMERICA: BUILDING A NEW FUTURE __ (1989).
210

See supra note __. In response to previous claims of
unlawful national origin or race discrimination, the Executive
Branch has been quick to deny that a regulation permitted such
discrimination. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 855-56 (1985).
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The law also affords considerable support for the federal
government to selectively enforce the immigration laws. In a
similar time of national crisis when U.S. citizens were held
hostage in Iran, a court of appeals in Narenji v. Civilletti
upheld a regulation that required only Iranian students on
nonimmigrant visas to report to the INS and provide information
about residence and evidence of school enrollment.211 The court
held that the regulation had a rational basis and emphasized
that it is not the business of courts to pass judgment on the
decisions of the President in the field of foreign policy. 212
Courts reviewing other regulations directed at Iranian citizens
211

See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); see also Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J.
545, 587-88 (1990) (discussing how district court had sought to
invalidate the President s action because it constituted
discrimination on the basis of nationality); Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding interdiction
and repatriation policy directed exclusively at Haitians).
212

Narenji, 617 F.2d at 748.
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refused to disturb the Executive Branch s judgment.213 This
precedent arguably supports the Justice Department s questioning
of all Arab and Muslim noncitizens.214 There are important
distinctions between this instance and that case, however. The
policy at issue in Narenji was based on nationality, while
current targeting of Arabs and Muslims, who are from many
different nations, is not. Whether this distinction would
provide the support for a successful legal challenge is unclear.

213

See, e.g., Ghaelian v. INS, 717 F.2d 950 (6th Cir.
1983) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction to review Equal
Protection challenge to regulation in deportation action);
Dasltmalchi v. INS, 660 F.3d 880 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Nademi v.
INS, 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding regulation allowing
Iranian citizens only 15 days before voluntarily departing the
country); Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981)
(same)
214

See supra text accompanying notes ___.
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Recent Supreme Court precedent further suggests that it will
be difficult to prevail on any claim that the federal government
is selectively enforcing the immigration laws.215 The Court in
215

See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that INA
242(g), 8
U.S.C.
1252(g), barred review of selective enforcement claim by
members of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine); supra
text accompanying notes __ (discussing case of LA-8). For
analysis of the selective enforcement claims on nationality and
foreign policy grounds, see Neuman, supra note __, at 338-41; see
also David A. Martin, On Counterintuitive Consequences and
Choosing the Right Control Group: A Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 363, 379-83 (2000) (suggesting that the Court in
its analysis should have considered noncitizen s stake in the
country, such as whether the person was a lawful permanent
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Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee expressed
disfavor of such claims: [t]he Executive should not have to
disclose its `real reasons for deeming nationals of a particular
country a special threat
or indeed for simply wishing to
antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that
country s nationals
and even if it did disclose them a court
would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly
unable to assess their adequacy. 216 The Court, however, offered
a narrow window for selective enforcement claims, acknowledging
the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of
discrimination is so outrageous that such a claim might lie.217
resident or on a temporary student visa).
216

at 491.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S.

217

Id.; cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51
(1984) (stating that exclusionary rule might apply to deportation
proceedings in cases of egregious violations of Fourth Amendment
or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence
obtained ) (citation omitted); Judy C. Wong, Note, Egregious
Fourth Amendment Violations and the Use of the Exclusionary Rule
in Deportation Hearings: The Need for Substantive Equal
Protection Rights for Undocumented Immigrants, 28 COLUM. HUM RTS.
L. REV. 431, 455-60 (1997) (summarizing lower court decisions
finding that immigration stop based exclusively on race was an

88

The judicial deference to the federal government s actions
directed at Iranians in the United States during the hostage
crisis was criticized in ways that apply equally to the reaction
to the response to the events of September 11:

egregious Fourth Amendment violation justifying application of
exclusionary rule).
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Narenji is troublesome because an executive classification
based on nationality in a foreign affairs crisis poses the
danger that the Executive will overvalue the government
interest and undervalue the individual constitutional
interest. In a severe crisis, the political and
psychological pressures on the Executive are extreme. In
this situation, executive measures may be motivated by
frustration or desperation rather than an assessment of
their actual usefulness, or they may reflect little more
than a desire to appear stern and decisive. Conversely, in
times of crisis the individual interests of persons selected
for special burdens may be grossly undervalued. Indeed, the
virulence of popular feeling against Iranian nationals
during the hostage crisis raises the possibility that the
Executive, in imposing special burdens on Iranian students,
may have been reflecting to some extent a constitutionally
impermissible hostility based on national origin. The
atmosphere during the hostage crisis was marked by a
hostility directed at citizens of Iran that resembled to
some extent the hostility that is frequently directed toward
citizens of an enemy nation during a war.218

218

See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under
Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 856 (1984) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted). Cf. PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE
U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE (2000)(analyzing how U.S. government has pursued
increased border enforcement for political and symbolic impacts
despite its overall lack of effectiveness).

90

In the aftermath of September 11, the U.S. government
arguably overreacted. Clearly, it placed little value on the
liberty and equality interests of Arabs and Muslims.219 The
response may be motivated in part by impermissible hostility
based on national origin.
Arabs and Muslims long have suffered
discrimination in the United States,220 and hate crimes against,
and animosity toward, Arabs and Muslims increased greatly after
September 11.221 With few legal constraints, the federal
government adopted extreme action, with a largely symbolic
impact.222
Moreover, the dragnet might prove to be a poor law
enforcement technique. Race profiling in criminal law
enforcement has been criticized because, by alienating minority
communities, it increases the difficulties of securing their
219

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

220

See, e.g., St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S.
604 (1987); Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir.
2001); see also supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing
hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims).
221

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

222

The claim that the federal government overreacted is
buttressed by the fact that some state and local authorities
refused to cooperate with some of the investigation. See infra
text accompanying notes ____.
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much-needed cooperation in law enforcement.223 In a time when
Arab and Muslim communities might be of assistance in
investigating terrorism, they are being rounded up, humiliated,
and discouraged from cooperating with law enforcement by fear of
arrest, detention, and deportation.

223

See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and
the Law: Why Driving While Black Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265,
298-300 (1999).
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Ultimately, this mass dragnet suggests to all persons of
Arab and Muslim ancestry in the United States, including U.S.
citizens, that they are less than full members of U.S. society.224
The various efforts by the U.S. government, even while claiming
that it is not discriminating against Arabs or Muslims,225
224

See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the
Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994)
(considering membership rights of aliens in national community);
Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the
Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996) (analyzing
partial membership rights accorded noncitizens in United
States); see also Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving
Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 185 (1998)
(studying application of membership paradigm to recent
immigration law developments). See generally KARST, supra note
__ (discussing efforts of various minorities to achieve full
membership in U.S. society).
225

See President Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist
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marginalize them. Consequently, the legal measures taken by the
federal government reinforce deeply-held negative stereotypes
(i.e., that they are foreign and possibly disloyal to the United
States) about Arabs and Muslims.226
2.

Visa Processing and Removals

Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), 37 COMP. PRES. DOCS.
1347, 1348 (2001 (emphasizing that war on terrorism was not a war
on Muslim people).
226

Cf. Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from
Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP.
CT. REV. 275, 327 (analyzing stigmatizing impact of racial
exclusions on federal immigration law on persons sharing that
ancestry in the country).
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Some of the September 11 airplane hijackers had entered the
country on student nonimmigrant visas but never attended
school.227 As one response, the State Department slowed its
issuance of visas to persons seeking entry from Arab nations.228
Such conduct is wholly within the hands of the Executive Branch.
In recent years, Congress has extended greater discretion to the
State Department in visa processing and, according to some
critics, increased the potential for nationality-based
discrimination in the visa issuance process.229 Moreover, the
merits of visa decisions by State Department consular officers
long have been immune from any judicial review.230
In November 2001, the INS announced its first mass arrest of
nonimmigrant students who had violated the terms of their visas;
the arrests were exclusively of students from nations with
alleged terrorist links, Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi

227

See infra text accompanying notes __. However, one
alleged co-conspirator in the hijackings apparently was denied a
visa four times and never was able to enter the country to
participate in the hijackings. See Kate Zrnike & James Risen,
Tracing a 16-Month Infusion of Men and Money, Culminating in the
Horror of Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B7.
228

See Neil A. Lewis & Christopher Marquis, Larger Visa
Waits for Arabs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A1; Matthew Purdy,
Bush s New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Landscape, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at 1A.
229

See William L. Pham, Comment, Section 633 of IIRIRA:
Immunizing Discrimination in Immigrant Visa Processing, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1461 (1998) (reviewing change in 1996 immigration reform
law). The 1996 amendment was a response to the decision in Legal
Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State,
45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that State Department had
engaged in nationality-based discrimination against Vietnamese
asylum-seekers in violation of immigration laws), vacated and
remanded, 519 U.S. 1 (1996).
230

See Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 217 (D. P.R.
1976). For analysis and suggested reform, see James A.R.
Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 1 (1991).
95

Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen.231 Additional scrutiny of visa
applications from certain nations with large Arab and Muslim
populations, as well as possible nationality-based reporting and
related requirements for immigrants and nonimmigrants in the
United States, like those seen in response to the Iranian hostage
crisis,232 could be on the horizon. Such measures might be
authorized by law,233 with any selective enforcement claims facing
formidable legal barriers.234

231

See James Sterngold with Diana Jean Schemo, 10 Arrested
in Visa Cases in San Diego, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at B1.
232

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

233

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

234

See supra text accompanying notes ___.
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Along similar lines, the Justice Department has announced
that it will focus removal efforts on 6,000 young men from the
Middle East who were subject to deportation orders.235 Although
the enforcement of removal orders is based on nationality, such
actions would be difficult to challenge legally.236
3.

Torture

The Arab and Muslim dragnet was not the most extreme option
considered in the wake of September 11. Indeed, the tenor of the
public debate allowed for consideration of policy alternatives
that previously would have been virtually unthinkable. Torture
to extract information, or the threat of sending a suspect to a
country that engaged in torture, was discussed as a policy
option.237 A public re-evaluation of the ordinary Fourth
235

See DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men from Al Qaeda
Haven Countries, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 115 (Jan. 21, 2002); Dan
Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Deportees,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A1.
236

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

237

See infra text accompanying notes ___.
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Amendment prohibition of such practices238 ensued.
Torture was contemplated because many of the material
witnesses arrested and detained in the dragnet in the weeks
following September 11239 did not provide information to the U.S.
government. Given the indiscriminate nature of the arrests,240
many in all likelihood did not have any relevant information.
Nonetheless, support for torture came from across the political
spectrum, including from persons known as advocates of civil
liberties.241
238

See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding
that search that shocked the conscience violated the Fourth
Amendment).
239

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

240

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

241

See Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 45 (quoting Harvard Law School
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professor Alan Dershowitz to effect that, if torture is to be
used, judicial approval should be required).
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Torture unquestionably is an extreme measure, going well
beyond the conventional law enforcement techniques of arrest,
detention, and interrogation. The consideration of extreme
measures reveals the popular perception about Muslim
terrorists. 242 As Professor Porras observed,
[t]he terrorist is transformed through the . . . rhetoric
from an ordinary deviant into a frightening, foreign,
barbaric beast at the same time that extra-normal means are
called for to fight terrorism. Since terrorists are never
imagined as anything other than terrifying, blood-thirsty
barbarians, ordinary law is understood to be deficient or
insufficient to deal with them.243
This classification of Arabs and Muslims as inhuman others taps
into a long history of nativism and the view that foreigners are
presumptively disloyal and dangerous to the security of the
United States.244
The legal use of torture hopefully will never come to pass
242

See supra text accompanying notes __.
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Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence
and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 121; cf. Kevin R. Johnson,
Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (199697) (analyzing how use of term alien in immigration law dehumanizes noncitizens and helps to rationalize their harsh
treatment).
244

See supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing
internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II).

100

in the United States. However, the fact that it was discussed in
polite company in the wake of September 11 demonstrates the
monumental
although perhaps temporary
shift in public opinion
about the need to protect civil liberties. At a minimum, the
serious discussion of torture broadened the spectrum of policy
options for fighting terrorism.
4.

Conclusion

The federal government acted quickly and nationally in
responding to the events of September 11. The law enforcement
tactics generally were based on group probabilities, not
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing or knowledge. A discrete
and insular minority suffered the consequences, with little
negative public reaction and general public support for the U.S.
government s response.
2.

Long Term Civil Rights Impacts

The federal government's reaction to the events of September
11, promise to have deep and enduring civil rights impacts. As
the not-so-distant past demonstrates, immigration reforms and
executive action, which have the appearance of responding to the
acts of terrorism, will remain with us and adversely affect the
rights of all immigrants and many citizens.245 Moreover, more
fundamental immigration reform proposals, namely the possible
regularization of the immigration status of many undocumented
immigrants in the United States and repeal of special secret
evidence procedures, under serious discussion before September 11
may well go by the wayside.246 The demise of regularization
proposals will maintain the uncertain legal status, and
accompanying vulnerability, of undocumented immigrants living on
the periphery of U.S. social life.247
245

See infra text accompanying notes __.

246

See infra text accompanying notes __.
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See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the
Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for
Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001) (contending that
federal labor law fails to adequately protect undocumented
workers); Maria L. Ontiveros, Forging Our Identity:
Transformative Resistance in the Areas of Work, Class, and the
Law, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1057 (2000) (analyzing efforts of
Mexican immigrants to resist their marginalization in economic
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and social life); see also Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187:
Undocumented Immigrants and the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 555, 576-77 (1996) ( [W]hile [the undocumented] formally are
afforded the minimum rights of personhood under the law, they lie
entirely outside the law s protections for many purposes, and
they live subject to the fear of deportation at virtually all
times. ) (citations omitted); Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol
Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International Human
Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT L L.J. 1 (2001) (discussing human rights
abuses suffered by undocumented Mexican workers in the United
States).
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Moreover, the focus on "Arab appearance" and Muslim identity
has revived debate about the propriety of race profiling in law
enforcement, an enduring problem for racial minorities in the
United States.248 Before September 11, the U.S. public and
policy-makers had come a long way in a relatively short time in
critically scrutinizing the use of race and perceived racial
appearance in criminal and immigration law enforcement. One day
promised to change all of that.
1.

Recent History: Oklahoma City and Immigration
Reform

The leeway afforded the federal government in immigration
matters249 allows the political branches to swiftly take
aggressive actions and appear to offer a quick fix to deeply
complex political, economic, and social problems. Immigration
reform will likely be one of the impacts of September 11. Recent
history offers a helpful, if not comforting, lessons in this
regard.

248

See infra text accompanying notes __.

249

See supra text accompanying notes __.
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In 1996, Congress passed tough immigration legislation in
response to the fear of terrorism in the wake of the Oklahoma
City bombing; the reforms created special removal proceedings for
alleged terrorists.250 This and other aspects of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act adversely affected
the Arab and Muslim community,251 as well as other noncitizens in
the United States.252 Congress enacted such drastic measures
despite the fact that a former U.S. army officer and U.S. citizen
was the primary perpetrator of the Oklahoma City bombing.253
The Antiterrorism Act arguably did little to quell the
threat of terrorism in the United States.254 However, it and
other 1996 immigration reform legislation, limited judicial
review of various deportation decisions, and adversely affected
noncitizens in other ways.255 Only in 2001 did the Supreme Court
250

See AEDPA, supra note __; supra text accompanying notes
__ (discussing AEDPA s provisions). For discussion of the severe
impacts of the 1996 immigration reforms on immigrants, see Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998); Nancy Morawetz,
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000);
infra note __ (citing authorities).
251

notes __.
252

See Whidden, supra note __; supra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying notes __.
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See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir.
1998). Despite the fact that Arabs and Muslims had nothing to do
with the bombing, hate crimes and threats against Arabs and
Muslims increased substantially after the bombing; in addition,
the initial stages of the criminal investigation that followed
focused on Arabs. See Whidden, supra note __, at 2863-65.
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See Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma
City, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2074 (1996). Domestic terrorists continue
to pose a serious threat to public safety in the United States.
See Whidden, supra note __, at 2853-60.
255

See Jennifer A. Beall, Are We Only Burning Witches?
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's
Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693 (1998); Lisa A. Solbakken,
Note, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Anti104

clarify a conflict among the circuits and ensure that habeas
corpus review of removal orders remained intact.256

Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-Terrorism Pretext, 63
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1381 (1997); see also Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (amending immigration laws in variety of
ways to the detriment of immigrants).
256

See INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
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As occurred in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing,
immigration reforms will likely be one response to September 11.
Proposed bills designed to better monitor nonimmigrants who enter
the country on student visas, respond to the fact that several of
the terrorists involved in the September 11 hijackings had
entered the country on such visas and never attended school.257 In
addition, public opinion polls suggest that voters may support
257

See Diana Jean Schemo, Eager for Foreign Students,
Universities Persuade Senator to Drop Plan to Limit Visas, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at 1B. Initially, Senator Diane Feinstein
proposed a moratorium on all student visas. See Diana Jean
Schemo, Access to U.S. Courses Is Under Scrutiny in Aftermath of
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B7.
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immigration, civil rights, and other restrictions aimed at Arabs
and Muslims, including U.S. citizens.258
258

See Richard Morin & Claude Deane, Most Americans Back
U.S. Tactics: Poll Finds Little Worry Over Rights, WASH. POST,
Nov. 29, 2001, at A1 (reporting poll results showing broad
support for Bush administration measures to combat terrorism with
little concern for loss of civil rights); USA Today/CNN/Gallup
Poll Results, Sept. 16, 2001 (showing that almost 50% of persons
polled supported a special identification card for Arabs,
including U.S. citizens, and that almost 60% favored more
intensive security checks before Arabs could board airplanes).
The public s willingness to sacrifice civil liberties remained
strong well after September 11, see Robin Tower & Janet Elder,
Public is Wary But Supportive on Rights Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2001, at A1 (reporting on poll data), with President Bush s
approval ratings at all-time highs, see Andrew Kohut, Will Bush
Bring the Party With Him?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at sec. 4,
p. 17 ( George W. Bush has set the modern presidential record for
stratospheric approval ratings - only Franklin Roosevelt and
Harry Truman had longer runs of nearly universal public
support. ). At one commencement ceremony in California, the
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audience heckled a
need for vigilance
to terrorism. See
Questions Draw the
at B1.

speaker off the stage after she spoke on the
in protecting civil liberties in the response
Timothy Egan, In Sacramento, A Publisher s
Wrath of the Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001,
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Congress already has taken an initial cut at the immigration
laws. Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act expands the definition
of terrorist activity in the immigration laws that may justify
the finding that may justify the findings that a noncitizen is
inadmissible to include a threat to use, or the use of, any
dangerous device, with intent to endanger, directly or
indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause
substantial damage to property ; this likely will result in an
additional removal ground for aliens convicted of simple assault
and similar crimes not ordinarily thought of as terrorist in
nature.259 The Act further provides that a spouse or child of a
terrorist who is also inadmissible generally is inadmissible.260
A noncitizen also may be deemed inadmissible for being
associated with a terrorist organization, whose broad terms
seem to build on the principle of guilt by association. 261 The
Act provides for retroactive application of the various changes
to the immigration laws.262 Congress also included appropriations
funds for increased border enforcement, even though there was no
evidence that the alleged terrorists evaded inspection at the
national borders.263
259

See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,
411 (amending
212(a)(3) (inadmissibility grounds) and 237(a)(4)(B) (removal
grounds) of INA).
260

411 (amending

261

411 (amending

See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,
212(a)(3) of INA).
See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,
212(a)(3) of INA).
262

See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,
411 (amending
212(a)(3) (inadmissibility grounds) and 237(a)(4)(B) (removal
grounds) of INA).
263

See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note __,
402 (authorizing
appropriations necessary to triple the Border Patrol personnel
along northern border). This provision responds to fears that
terrorists might seek to enter the country from Canada, and the
arrest, and later conviction, of an Algerian man with bomb-making
materials seeking to enter the United States from Canada on the
eve of the new millennium. See Jane Fritsch, Algerian Sentenced
in 1999 Plot to Bomb Airport, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A26;
Sam Howe Verhovek with Tim Weiner, Man Seized with Bomb Parts at
Border Spurs U.S. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at A1. The
Act s emphasis on northern border enforcement may shift the
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myopic focus from the southern border with Mexico, which was the
primary place of heightened border enforcement in the 1990s. See
Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C.
DAVIS. J. INT L L. & POL Y (forthcoming 2001) (analyzing human
impacts of greatly increased border enforcement operations along
U.S./Mexico border).
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In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Act, which
placed airport security in the hands of the federal government,
made U.S. citizenship a qualification for airport security
personnel.264 Although possibly constitutional,265 the citizenship
requirement injures many lawful immigrants who had held these
low-wage jobs.266 Somewhat ironically, while immigrants can be
264

Pub. L. No. 107-71
____ (2001).

111(a)(2)(A)(ii), 115 Stat. 597,

265

See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (refusing to find
unconstitutional state law barring aliens from employment as
public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)
(upholding state law requirement that citizenship requirements
for police officers).
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266

See Steven Greenhouse, Groups Seek to Lift Ban on
Foreign Screeners, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B10 (reporting
that 80% of the security screeners at San Francisco International
Airport and 40% of those at Los Angeles International are
immigrants facing loss of their jobs); see also Sam Skolnik, INS
Checking Sea-Tac Workers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 28, 2001,
at A1 (stating that Immigration & Naturalization Service was
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conscripted into the military,267 they cannot serve in airport
security positions.

reviewing immigration status of Seattle airport s 18,000 workers
because of security concerns).
267

See 50 U.S.C. app.
453 (1994); see also Charles E.
Roh, Jr. & Frank K. Upham, The Status of Aliens Under United
States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. J. INT L L. 501 (1972). It is
noteworthy that President Ford issued an order limiting federal
service positions to citizens, see 41 Fed. Reg. 37303 (1976),
after the Supreme Court had invalidated a Civil Service
Commission rule to that effect, see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976).
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More generally, the events of September 11 likely will
adversely impact long contemplated reforms to immigration law and
enforcement, with likely impacts on people of color. Before the
bombings, immigrant rights advocates believed it possible that
Congress would ameliorate some of the harsh provisions of the
1996 immigration legislation, including possible elimination of
the secret evidence proceedings.268 Indeed, during the 2000
Presidential campaign, George W. Bush claimed that the Clinton
administration s use of secret evidence proceedings against Arabs
and Muslims amounted to unlawful racial profiling.269 The
abolition of secret evidence proceedings currently appears out of
the question.
Over the last few years, immigration rights activists had
mobilized support of a coalition of groups for a series of
immigration reforms to Fix 96," a response to the harsh
consequences of the 1996 immigration reforms.270 All such
268

See Secret Evidence Repeal Act, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong.,
2d Sess. (2000); Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2000; supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing secret
evidence cases).
269

See Vice President Gore and Governor Bush Participate
in Second Presidential Debate, FDCH POL. TRANSCRIPTS, Oct. 11,
2000.
270

See Somini Sengupta, The Immigration Debate: Full
Employment Opens the Door, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000, at 4
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legislative proposals probably died on that day.

(discussing Fix 96 Campaign and various immigration reform
efforts); Eric Lipton, As More are Deported, a 96 Law Faces
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at A1 (same); see also PETER
H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS (1998) (referring to
1996 reforms as radical and that Congress severely restricted
the legal rights of both legal and illegal immigrants ).
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Moreover, a short-lived historical moment appeared in early
2001 promising a fundamental transformation of U.S./Mexico
migration. Only days before September 11, public discussion had
been ongoing about the possibility of dramatic changes to the
migration relationship between the two nations. The Mexican
government supported a program that would allow for the
regularization of the immigration status of many undocumented
Mexican migrants in the United States,271 while the Bush
administration pushed for a temporary work program.272 Although
difficult sticking points remained,273 a compromise appeared
possible. After September 11, such reform discussion virtually
disappeared, perhaps another casualty of the catastrophic events
of that day.274
Regularizing migration from Mexico promised to make the
issue of undocumented immigration more manageable for the United
States. Mexican citizens represent a significant portion of the
population.275 Thus, undocumented workers will remain in the
shadows of U.S. social life. Mexican immigrants also may
experience the ripple effects of the heightened border
enforcement.276 Only time will tell whether a historic
271

See Ginger Thompson, U.S. and Mexico to Open Talks on
Freer Migration of Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A1.
272

See id.

273

See Eric Schmitt, No Agreement Yet With Mexico on
Immigration Plan, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001, at A1
(quoting Senator Phil Gramm, who supported guest worker program
but vowed that any legalization program would have to be passed
`over my cold, dead political body ).
274

See Ronald Brownstein, Green Light, Red Light; Is the
Push to Liberalize Immigration Policy a Casualty of the Surprise
Terrorist Attacks on September 11?, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 19, 2001,
at 28; Tim Weiner & Ginger Thompson, Mexico Lower on Bush s List
Since Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A4.
275

See U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 240 (2000) (Table I) (compiling
statistical data showing that, as of 1996, about 54% of
undocumented immigrant population was of Mexican origin).
276

See Fox Butterfield, Drug Seizures Have Surged at the
Border Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at sec. 1A, p. 32
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opportunity to reform the migration relations between the United
States and Mexico was destroyed with the World Trade Center.
2.

Race Profiling

(noting impacts of increased border enforcement after September
11); Richard Serrano, Arrests on Border Fall After 9/11, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at A1 (reporting fewer arrests on border
after September 11 perhaps due to increased fears of arrest and
detention).

117

In the last few years, the use of race profiling in criminal
law enforcement previously had undergone sustained attack.277
Presidential hopefuls had criticized race profiling by police in
traffic stops.278 After the 2000 election, both President Bush
and Attorney General Ashcroft publically condemned race
profiling.279
Similarly, the argument had been powerfully made that racebased enforcement of the immigration laws is inappropriate.280
277

See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic
Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Harris, supra note __.
278

See Richard L. Berke, Gore and Bradley Duel, Briefly on
Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 200, at A20.
279

See Attorney General Seeks End to Racial Profiling,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A20. Previously, as a presidential
candidate, George Bush had claimed that the Clinton
Administration s use of secret evidence proceedings against
Muslim immigrants amounted to racial profiling. See supra text
accompanying notes __.
280

See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling
in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 675 (2000).
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Although the Supreme Court condoned the practice in 1975,281 one
court of appeals in 2000 held that the Border Patrol could not
consider a person s Hispanic appearance in making an
immigration stop.282 The profile was over-inclusive, pulling in
too many U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents and
subjecting them to civil rights deprivations, as well as allowing
for the arrest of a small number of undocumented immigrants.

281

87 (1975).

See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-

282

See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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Moreover, sustained public criticism of race profiling in
national security matters came in the wake of the Wen Ho Lee
debacle in which trumped up espionage charges evaporated when
exposed to the light of day.283 This case is instructive with
respect to the current situation of Arabs and Muslims in the
United States, in part because Lee was presumed to be disloyal
because of long held stereotypes about Asians.284
In all of these circumstances, law enforcement based on
alleged group propensities runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution,
which is generally premised on the view that individualized
suspicion is necessary for stops.285 Unfortunately, governmental
reliance on statistical probabilities at the core of the
283

See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial
Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689
(2000); WU, supra note __, at 176-90.
284

See Leti Volpp, Obnoxious to Their Very Nature : Asian
Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71, 79-82
(2001); Thomas W. Joo, What, If Not Race, Tagged Lee?, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2001, at part 2, p. 13.
285

See supra note __ (citing cases).
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opposition to racial profiling, have been resurrected by the
September 11 terrorist attacks.
After the tragedy of September 11, persons of apparent Arab
ancestry were questioned for possible links to terrorism, removed
from airplanes, and generally subject to extra scrutiny at every
turn.286 To many, the reconsideration of the use of race in law
enforcement made perfect sense. Public opinion, at least for a
time, quickly shifted to favor race profiling in the war on
terrorism.287 If the shift proves enduring, it could have long
term impacts, including encouraging reconsideration of the
efforts to end race profiling in all law enforcement.
The federal government s profiling of Arabs and Muslims in
the investigation promotes the legitimacy of race profiling.288
It also has undermined federal efforts to pressure state and
local law enforcement agencies to end the practice. One member
286

See supra text accompanying notes __.
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See Sam Howe Verhovek, Americans Give in to Race
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at A1; see, e.g., Profiles
in Timidy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A18 (endorsing race
profiling in war on terrorism); James Q. Wilson & Heather R.
Higgins, Profiles in Courage, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at A12
(same); Stuart Taylor Jr., The Case for Using Racial Profiling at
the Airports, NAT L J., Sept. 22, 2001 (advocating race profiling
of Arab appearing people on airplanes); Bruce Fein, A
Commensurate Response, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17
(advocating many measures, such as revoking executive order
prohibiting U.S. assassinations of foreign leaders, and calling
for President Bush and Congress to authorize race and religious
profiling in efforts to investigate international terrorism). As
profiling becomes commonplace, one might think that terrorists
might try to have terrorists who did not fit the Arab
stereotype. Cf. Johnson, supra note __, at 711 (making similar
point with respect to race profiling along the U.S./Mexican
border). It appears that profiling may not be all that
successful; in flying from France to the United States, one
Muslim convert with explosives in his shoes was able to board a
domestic flight despite heightened security. See Sebastian
Rotella & Marjorie Miller, Terrorists are Difficult to Profile,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A1.
288

See supra text accompanying notes __.
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of Congress proclaimed that anyone with a diaper on his head and
a fan belt around that diaper should be stopped and
questioned.289 A Republican member of Congress of Lebanese
descent (Darrell Issa) accused Air France of race profiling in
denying him a seat on a flight to Europe.290 An Arab American
Secret Service agent assigned to protect President Bush was
denied access to an American Airlines flight.291

289

See Apology from Congressman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2001, at A16.
290

See Rep. Issa Says His Arab Name Kept Him Off Flight,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at A1; see also Rosenzweig, supra note
__ (reporting on indictment of two Jewish Defense League leaders
for conspiracy to blow up Issa s congressional office).
291

See Guard for Bush Isn t Allowed Aboard Flight, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at B5.
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Interestingly, state and federal tensions have arisen due to
the federal government s racial profiling in the wake of
September 11. Several local law enforcement agencies resisted
the Attorney General s request for cooperation in interviewing
Arabs and Muslims292 in hopes of uncovering information about the
bombings on the grounds that this constituted impermissible
racial profiling.293 In addition, the Attorney General also
requested that the U.S. government should be informed if an
interviewee was suspected of being in the country in violation of
the immigration laws.294 This, of course, would discourage
immigrant cooperation with the police and make local law
enforcement more difficult.295
****
In short, the U.S. government s response to the loss of life
of September 11 promises to have long term immigration and civil
rights impacts. The impacts may well be felt by citizens as well
as immigrants of many different ancestries. Unfortunately, this
continues a pattern in U.S. history.296
CONCLUSION
The stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims historically has had a
dramatic impact on immigration law and policy. Separate
procedures and the selective enforcement of the immigration laws
has adversely affected the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims in
292

See supra text accompanying notes ___.

293

See Fox Butterfield, Police are Split on Questioning of
Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at A1; Jim Adams, Twin
Cities Police Undecided on Helping FBI, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
MN), Nov. 22, 2001, at 7B. Some resistance stems from local laws
and regulations limiting police cooperation with the INS, which
were designed to encourage crime victims and witnessed to
cooperate with local law enforcement. See, e.g., Patrick J.
McDonnell, INS Hunt Not Seen as Issue for LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
8, 2001, at Part 2, p.4 (discussing 1979 Los Angeles Police
Department directive barring officers from inquiring about
immigration status).
294

See supra text accompanying notes ____.
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296

See supra text accompanying notes ___.
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the United States. The most recent war on terrorism has built
on previous anti-terrorist measures. Sadly but not unexpectedly,
private discrimination frequently has accompanied governmental
action directed at Arabs and Muslims.
The federal government s response to the events of September
11 reveals much about the relationship between immigration and
civil rights. The federal government responded with a vengeance,
in a national fashion focusing on Arab and Muslim noncitizens
across the country. With few legal constraints, and the public
willing to sacrifice civil liberties of Arab and Muslims in the
name of national security, the federal government pursued harsh
means with little resistance.
The events of September 11 reveal the limited membership
rights accorded persons of Arab and Muslim ancestry in the United
States, U.S. citizens as well as immigrants. Such treatment has
been suffered by various groups in this nation's history. Many
of those groups, such as African Americans, Asian Americans, and
Latinos, continue to strive for full membership in this society.
Only time will tell whether Arab and Muslim Americans will ever
achieve that goal, or perhaps which group will replace them as
the demons of tomorrow.
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